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The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost 
Brian Galle* 
Abstract: 
“Externalities,” or harms to others, provide a standard justification for 
government intervention in the private market. There is less agreement over 
whether government is justified in correcting “internalities,” or harms we inflict 
on our own health or well-being. While some of the internality dispute is 
philosophical, some is practical. Critics suggest government lacks information to 
regulate internalities, and that any intervention would inefficiently distort a 
private market for self-help. This Article argues that these critiques of regulation 
overlook well-established tools of externality regulation, as well as a burgeoning 
literature on the measurement of internalities. 
Having answered the “should” question, the Article moves on to “how?” It 
examines the established tools of externality regulation and considers to what 
extent the standard advice of the externality literature extends to internality 
regulation. In departures from earlier consensus, the analysis suggests that 
“carrots” may at times be an attractive alternative to “sticks,” and that even large 
taxes on internalities can produce a so-called “double dividend.” The Article also 
compares traditional regulatory options to “nudges” and other forms of 
cognitively-informed government interventions. It identifies a set of cases in 
which nudges may be preferable to either taxes or command and control 
regulation. 
Thus, this Article’s analysis also helps to resolve a second, related, debate 
over the propriety of nudges. The nudge debate has almost exclusively revolved 
around whether nudges avoid philosophical objections to paternalistic 
government regulation. This Article offers instead a new reason to employ 
nudges in some cases: they are more efficient. 
 
                                                 
 * Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for helpful comments and 
suggestions from Gregg Bloche, Jacob Goldin, Jim Hines, Louis Kaplow, Saul Levmore, Katie 
Pratt, Chris Robertson, Ben Roin, Carol Rose, Darien Shanske, Peter Siegelman, Jessica Silbey, 
and attendees of presentations at Arizona University Law School, Boston College Law School, 
Loyola-L.A. Law School, the University of Connecticut Law School, the U.C. Berkeley Burch 
Center Colloquium on Public Finance, the Murphy Institute for Public Finance at Tulane 
University, the Boston Area Summer Research Group, and the annual meeting of the National Tax 
Association. The editorial staff of the YJHPLE provided excellent substantive advice and copy 
editing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governments properly act to protect people from one another, or so political 
philosophers have long agreed.1 Increasingly, the modern regulatory state also 
steps in to protect us from ourselves. Obviously, regulation of tobacco, opiates, 
and other addictive drugs falls into this category, but so too can “fat taxes,”2 
social security and retirement savings policy,3 the regulation of consumer 
financial products,4 internet privacy rules,5 the design of crop and flood insurance 
programs,6 government oversight of workplace safety and health,7 mandatory 
vaccinations (which protect not only children and their classmates but also 
parents who would otherwise suffer when their child contracts a terrible disease), 
and many others. Evidence suggests waiting periods to purchase firearms may 
best be justified as a policy to reduce suicide,8 and one might say much the same 
about laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets.9 
To be sure, “paternalism” is not new. The possibility that government might 
help us avoid these kinds of regrettable decisions dates back at least to Aristotle 
and possibly Homer, depending on how metaphorically one wants to read the 
Odyssey.10 
But as vast and culturally pervasive as the paternalism literature has become, 
it has tended toward the philosophical, lingering on the propriety of government 
intervention to correct self-harms.11 A decade, for instance, after Sunstein & 
                                                 
 1 E.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Ch.9 §§ 123–31 (1696). 
 2 Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed 
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1244–58 (2005). 
 3 Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic 
Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1278–82 (1991). 
 4 John Y. Campbell, Howell Jackson, & Bridget Madrian, Consumer Financial Protection, 25 
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 91, 92–106 (2011); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit 
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7– 25(2008). 
 5 Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower 
Norms, 57 RUTGERS L.J. 1235, 1260–68, 1282–99 (2005). 
 6 HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY MCMORROW, INSURANCE AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 114–26 (2013). 
 7 Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW & ECONOMICS 1349, 
1354–56 (Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. 2007). 
 8 See Jens Ludwig & Philip Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with 
Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 586–91 (2000) 
(finding that waiting periods reduced suicide but not homicide). 
 9 David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson, Motorcyclist Fatality Rates and Mandatory 
Helmet-Use Laws, 40 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREVENTION 200, 201–08 (2008) (finding fatality rates 
up to 33% lower in mandatory-helmet states). 
 10 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 3, 8 (2000). 
 11 E.g., JULIAN LE GRAND & BILL NEW, GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY STATE OR 
HELPFUL FRIEND? 105–82 (2015). 
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Thaler first introduced the idea that government might “nudge” us toward better 
decisions,12 the nudge debate remains caught up in cycles of argument over 
whether nudging is consistent with libertarian values.13 
This is a frustrating state of affairs for those who are relatively comfortable 
with government intervention in the marketplace.14 Human failings and new 
developments in how they can be addressed raise difficult and important 
questions, none so far addressed comprehensively in the existing literature.15 
Many governments already are deeply committed to helping consumers 
overcome what the governments perceive to be poor choices.16 Canada, 
Australia, and many other countries around the world regulate tobacco with a 
complex regime in which manufacturers cannot display brand information, and 
instead must print disturbing images illustrating the health consequences of 
smoking.17 The United States has proposed a similar policy, which currently is 
                                                 
 12 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1190–95 (2003); see generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 
(rev. & expanded ed. 2009). 
 13 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1867–97 
(2013); Symposium, The Ethics of Nudging: Evaluating Libertarian Paternalism, 14 GEORGETOWN 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645 et seq. (2016); Christian Coons & Michael Weber, Introduction, in 
PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 15–23 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013). 
 14 On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law 
and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2127–32 (2008); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How 
Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1596–98 (2014); Lauren 
E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1227–29 (2013). Bubb & 
Pildes argue that policy makers should “analyze [nudges] much as we would analyze explicit 
mandates,” and make a “full comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of different 
regulatory instruments,” supra at 1601, but they do not engage in that analysis themselves. This 
Article does. 
 15 The notable major exception to the absence of substantive analysis of internality regulation 
is a short recent policy brief focused on energy use by Sunstein and Hunt Allcott, an NYU 
economist. Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. 
Working Paper No. 21187, Feb. 2015), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/16150609 [hereinafter 
Sunstein & Allcott, Working Paper]; for a condensed published version, see Hunt Allcott & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 698 (2015). Allcott and Sunstein 
briefly consider some of the issues I address, including the choice between different approaches to 
regulation. Working Paper at 7–9. But their treatment is cursory, omits most of the analysis offered 
here, and as a result goes astray at one or two points. See infra notes 227, 271. 
Another partial analysis is Jacob Goldin & Nicholas Lawson, Defaults, Mandates, and Taxes: 
Policy Design with Active and Passive Decision-Makers, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 438 (2016). 
Goldin & Lawson show persuasively that the combination of taxes and nudges can be superior to a 
flat ban on harmful choices along some dimensions, id. at 441–42, but they presume that nudges 
will always be used for passive actors, taxes for active. Id. at 450. My central question is what 
extent these instruments may be preferable for either set of actors. It also is unclear whether their 
framework extends to other irrationality settings. Finally, they do not consider income, revenue, or 
distributive effects, among other considerations examined here. See infra Part IV. 
 16 Coons & Weber, supra note 13, at 1. 
 17 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGING, EVALUATION OF THE 
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tied up in litigation.18 Are these “graphic images” the best way to regulate 
smoking, or would something else, like a higher tobacco tax, be the best choice? 
Critics’ qualms do not relieve courts and other actors in these regimes from 
having to confront the question of regulatory design. 
In addition to neglecting the practical urgency of advancing the debate, the 
paternalism debaters overlook a standard argument for regulation, tracing all the 
way back to Ronald Coase’s classic essay “The Problem of Social Cost.”19 The 
typical critique of government intervention rests on government’s supposed 
inability to know better than the individual what will satisfy that person’s 
preferences.20 For many self-harms, however, we can observe that individuals 
want to behave otherwise, but struggle to overcome their own worst impulses. 
We join Weight Watchers, enlist our employers to help us save, buy gym 
memberships we know it will be costly to escape. In essence, what we are seeing 
is two close neighbors, sharing the same piece of property, at war over how best 
to live. 
Self-harms, that is, closely resemble Coase’s framework for thinking about 
regulation. In a perfectly functioning market with effective property rights, Coase 
notes, neighbors can negotiate with each other to come to agreements on harms 
and benefits that cross property lines.21 More realistically, in many cases the 
transaction costs of negotiating make these deals impossible or prohibitively 
expensive, so that government may need to step in to reproduce the bargain the 
parties might otherwise have struck.22 I’ll show here that this same analysis can 
often be readily applied to self-harms—neighbors in the same body, struggling to 
agree—though I also note that in some cases the existence of private markets for 
self-correction complicate the story. 
Transaction costs alone are not a complete justification for regulation. Even 
if government is right that there is a problem, compliance and enforcement carry 
                                                                                                                         
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GRAPHIC HEALTH WARNINGS ON TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING 12–15, 
http://webarchive.nla.gov.au/gov/20140801094920/http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publish
ing.nsf/Content/phd-tobacco-eval-graphic-health-warnings-full-report; David Hammond, Health 
Warning Messages on Tobacco Products: A Review, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 327, 327 (2011). 
 18 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
The underlying First Amendment basis for the D.C. Circuit’s initial rejection of the graphic images 
rules was later overruled by the Court sitting en banc in a different case, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc), leaving the future of the rules 
unclear. Similar rules for smokeless tobacco are still in effect. See Smokeless Tobacco Labeling and 
Warning Statement Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (Jan. 1, 2018), 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/ucm2023662.htm. 
 19 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 20 Claire Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 444, 445–48 (2007). Most of 
these arguments trace back to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8 (Kathy Casey ed., 2002) (1859). 
 21 Coase, supra note 19, at 5, 11. 
 22 Id. at 13–16. 
5
Galle: The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:1 (2018) 
6 
costs that might make regulation wasteful overall. 23 But law and economics has 
already grappled with a similar set of problems in a similar context. As Coase 
suggests, a basic economic rationale for government regulation is the presence of 
externalities—harms or benefits that one of us creates for the others, in settings 
where the producer of the harms or benefits has limited incentives to care about 
the well-being of those affected by the spillovers.24 Here, too, government faces 
the problem of incomplete information: how much does it cost to remedy an 
externality problem, and what is the value to society of the remedy?25 
Over the past forty years or more, law and economics and related fields, 
such as environmental economics, have developed an elaborate set of answers to 
the challenges of limited information and transaction costs. Contemporary 
debates focus on a handful of key design questions about the structure of 
regulation, and to a surprising degree have reached something like consensus on 
many points.26 
My focus here will therefore be on to what extent the lessons of the 
externality-regulation literature apply to government efforts to protect us from 
ourselves.27 Following the terminology of some leading economic commentators, 
I will call these failures of self-regard “internalities.”28 I first show how many 
lessons of the externality literature help to resolve practical complaints about 
whether we should even be engaged in paternalistic regulation, and document 
how more recent scholarly innovations go even further to resolve critics’ 
concerns. I then move on to more concrete design questions. 
To preview briefly my results, I find that many settled lessons of the 
externality literature are likely to be different, often profoundly different, in the 
internality context. “Command and control” regulation or its contemporary 
cousin, the “nudge,” could dominate corrective taxation; rewards might be better 
than punishments, and legal rules can be important tools of redistribution. These 
                                                 
 23 Jeff Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 N’WESTERN UNIV. 
L. REV. 1165, 1219–25 (2003). 
 24 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (3d ed. 2011). 
 25 Id. at 137–39. 
 26 For an overview, see Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge? Evaluating the New 
Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 848–53 (2014). 
 27 My focus on choice of instruments distinguishes this Article from the small handful of 
earlier efforts at analyzing paternalistic regulation through economic tools. In Eyal Zamir, The 
Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998), Professor Zamir offers a model for deciding 
when regulation of individual failings will on net increase welfare, with the main factors being a 
balance of individual benefit against the “frustration” and administrative costs of regulating. Id. at 
263–65. Zamir does not attempt to distinguish between different regulatory options. 
 28 E.g., Jonathan Gruber, Tobacco at the Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking 
Regulation in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 206 (2001). The term is generally 
attributed to Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual 
Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 149 (1993). 
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points probably need some unpacking for those who are not already deeply 
immersed in externality regulation. 
Let me first try to be clear at the outset what I mean by an internality. What I 
have in mind is an outcome that the individual, if they deliberated about their 
choice in a coolly reflective, objective moment, would reject.29 I wish I had gone 
to the gym last week, and that I had not eaten that second slice of pecan pie, and 
that I had saved more for retirement. 
I want to distinguish these kinds of regretted outcomes from simple 
ignorance. Sometimes, we go wrong because we do not have all the information 
to make the right choice. Often, though, it’s rational for us not to gather all the 
data ourselves, since information acquisition is costly.30 In these cases it is 
relatively straightforward that government should just provide the information, or 
subsidize its production by others,31 although to be sure the design of the best 
information-sharing regime is not always obvious.32 Our challenge here is 
different. What should we do about people who might have the necessary 
information available, but still act—or fail to act—in ways that are wrong for 
them? 
As we’ll see, human decision making can go wrong in a number of different 
ways. I’ll argue that the best regulatory design for a given problem often will be 
different, depending on what kind of error individuals are making. Thus, one of 
the contributions of the paper will be to group and categorize these errors in ways 
that are analytically useful. 
One other preliminary point to make is that my analysis is aimed at what 
might be called “unforced errors.” Many individuals make decisions that do not 
maximize their own preferences because they have been tricked or misled by 
others, usually for profit.33 Assuming we’re confident that trickery is in fact 
happening, the case for regulation in those cases is little different than the case 
                                                 
 29 Zamir, supra note 27, at 237; see Allcott & Sunstein, Working Paper, supra note 14, at 12 
(“[P]aternalistic regulation can be limited to situations in which individuals’ choices are 
demonstrably inconsistent . . . .”). 
 30 John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 671 (1996); Roy 
Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360, 1363 
(1996). 
 31 Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1375–76 (2015). 
 32 For example, recent commentators critique most efforts to cure information market failures, 
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 59–118 (2014), and propose extensive (if pessimistic) design solutions for 
some of these problems, id. at 121–37. I do not mean to claim that there is always a clear-cut 
difference between simple ignorance and more complex cognitive problems. See Zamir, supra note 
27, at 254. I only intend to rule out those cases of information failure that indeed are 
straightforwardly rational. 
 33 Willis, supra note 14, at 1170–73. 
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for prohibiting robbery or fraud.34 This is not to say that the choices regulators 
must make are simple, as private actors can respond to each move the regulator 
makes to protect consumers. Those are interesting challenges, but they have been 
well addressed by others. 
With that definitional work out of the way for the moment, let’s turn back to 
the externality-regulation literature. A central issue for any would-be regulator is 
to choose what tools or “instruments” the government will employ.35 Should 
government regulate using “prices” or more traditional “command and control” 
regulation? If it’s a price, should the price be a penalty (stick) or reward (carrot)? 
A carbon tax, a subsidy for going green, or a hard cap on the tons of carbon 
emitted? In recent work I suggest that behaviorally-informed policies with 
“surprising” impact, including what Sunstein & Thaler term “nudges,” also can 
be fit into this framework.36 
While there is some nuance in the literature’s answers, as with any important 
and complex question, the general consensus is that sticks are the best choice.37 
The government can design a price to capture most of the features of a hard cap, 
and in addition sticks bring in money and elicit more information from the 
public.38 Carrots can reveal private information, but also cost money, and even 
worse they may induce moral hazard: bad actors will commit bad deeds simply in 
order to be paid to stop. 
I’ll argue here that often none of these traditional advantages of sticks apply 
to internality regulation. Contrary to a celebrated result from Ronald Coase, 
moral hazard is a small concern for internalities, because it is difficult to credibly 
threaten to injure oneself for gain.39 Prices induce rational actors to reveal their 
private costs of compliance with the government’s preference, but of course the 
problem for internality sufferers is that their responsiveness does not necessarily 
                                                 
 34 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1239 n.28 (1985). 
 35 Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 755–60 (1999); Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, 64 
STANFORD L. REV. 797, 813–40 (2012). 
 36 Galle, supra note 26, at 854–59. The main difference between that earlier paper and this is 
the earlier work focuses almost entirely on externalities, or in a few instances externalities mixed 
with internalities. The category of “surprising” regulation is broader than nudges. According to 
Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge is an instrument that, for a fully rational actor, would have no or 
minimal welfare effects. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12. A surprising regulation, in my 
systematization, is any whose effects are larger than rational-choice theory would predict, and so 
can include instruments whose impact is non-negligible. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An 
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2087 (2012) (noting that “sticky defaults” 
may have “moderate” cost). For more discussion of the significance of the difference, see Brian 
Galle, What’s In a Nudge?, 3 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 1 (2017). 
 37 See infra Part I.A. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Coase, supra note 19, at 42. 
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reflect the real long-term costs and benefits they face. Government must use 
other methods, such as experiments, menus, and self-targeting regulation, to 
reach the right actors when it regulates internalities, and these methods work 
roughly the same whether the instrument is denominated in dollars or not. 
Taxes and other sticks still bring in more money than other options, of 
course, but in some instances the revenues are not worth the extra costs they 
bring. Building on my earlier work in the externality context, I show that 
“nudges” can potentially be a better choice on net, despite the absence of 
revenue. On this front I depart from earlier work by economists arguing that 
“small” internality-correcting taxes on soda or other tempting foods can be 
highly efficient.40 I argue that this claim does not always hold for taxes large 
enough to affect consumers’ labor-supply decisions. 
Overall, it will turn out that the best choice of instrument depends on what 
kind of mistake individuals are making. For those of us who struggle with 
willpower or impatience, taxes may dominate. For those of us who go wrong 
through failures of attention—for instance, by neglecting our retirement 
savings—nudges look, at least on current available evidence, to be a more 
promising alternative. 
In sum, while the lessons of the externality literature may not apply fully in 
the internality context, the analytical tools of that literature remain powerful. 
Even at this early stage of academic study of internalities, we can form some 
good hypotheses about what an efficient internality-regulation regime might look 
like. Whether that is enough to satisfy critics of internality regulation I cannot 
say. But many governments are already embarked on fairly extensive internality 
regulation. My analysis here offers a first, tentative, glance at how those 
regulations should take shape in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
This Part provides context for readers who may be unfamiliar with aspects of 
my argument. Part I.A. offers a general overview of economic approaches to 
externality regulation.41 Part I.B. then briefly summarizes the concept of 
“internalities.” Finally, Part I.C. offers some definitions and caveats going 
forward; even readers familiar with the concepts in Parts I.A. and I.B. may want 
to briefly visit I.C. 
                                                 
 40 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825, 1827 
(2006). 
 41 Part I.A. repeats, in essentially identical form, my earlier summary of this topic. Galle, 
supra note 26, at 843–46. 
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A.  Regulating Externalities 
Modern economic theories of government regulation begin with the premise 
that markets sometimes fail.42 Externalities are a classic example.43 An 
externality, simply put, is a harm (“negative externality”) or benefit (“positive 
externality”) that affects someone other than the actor making an economic 
decision.44 
In general, the goal of regulation is neither to eliminate negative nor to 
produce boundless quantities of positive externalities, but rather to achieve what 
might be called the optimal level of externality.45 Eliminating even the worst 
pollutants is costly. Should government bankrupt coal producers, or is there a 
way to balance clean air against the costs of achieving it? On the positive 
externality side, everyone might agree that charity is beneficial. But should 
government spend millions to clothe or educate one more child? 
Economists typically answer these kinds of balancing questions using 
marginal analysis.46 Under this approach, the policy maker asks herself, “on the 
margin—that is, for the very next unit of good or bad produced—what is the 
harm or benefit of that one unit for everyone in society?” We might therefore call 
this “marginal social damage,” in the case of a negative externality, or “marginal 
social benefit” for a positive one. She then compares this harm or benefit against 
the marginal costs to the producer. If the producer’s private marginal cost is 
greater than the marginal social damage, it does not pay, on net, to prevent the 
damage: counting the producer’s losses, society would lose by forcing the 
producer to avoid the externality.47 
The point at which these two quantities are equal is known as the optimal 
point, the point at which there are no social gains from either more or less 
externality correction.48 With greater externality correction, the costs of charity 
                                                 
 42 GRUBER, supra note 24, at 3. 
 43 Id. at 4. 
 44 Id. at 122–23. 
 45 Id. at 137–39; Gloria E. Helfand et al., The Theory of Pollution Control, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
ENVTL. ECON. 249, 253 (Karl-Goran Maher & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003). 
 46 GRUBER, supra note 42, at 126. 
 47 Note, importantly, that for simplicity we are assuming here that we should count the costs 
and benefits for the producer and everyone else equally. That is a controversial proposition, but I’ll 
leave it aside here for ease of exposition. 
 48 I’m simplifying here for the sake of exposition. A more rigorous approach to setting the 
optimal quantity would also account for other factors that might affect the efficiency of the 
regulation. For example, if the regulation imposes costs, and the expectation of those costs changes 
behaviors other than the production of the externality—for example, distorts consumer choices 
among products—the ideal regulation might balance disruption of these expectations against 
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or pollution reduction outweigh the benefits. With less, we have left cost-
effective improvements on the table. 
We could imagine a few ways of achieving production at this optimal level. 
If government knew the shapes of the two curves, it could calculate the optimal 
quantity and simply mandate that producers achieve it, with jail for those who 
refuse. 
Another approach is to set a price for producers. In the case of pollution, 
government could impose a fee or tax on each unit of carbon, in an amount equal 
to the producer’s marginal cost at the optimum. Call this price “tau”. For 
producers whose costs of eliminating the next unit of carbon are below tau, they 
will eliminate it, saving themselves tau minus their cost. For producers whose 
costs are above tau, they will simply emit the carbon and pay the tax. Thus, just 
as with the mandate, rational producers should produce exactly the optimal 
amount of carbon. Or, similarly, government could pay producers to eliminate 
carbon or produce charity. Once more, if the government offers a price tau, only 
producers who can fill a shelter bed for less than tau will take the offer. 
Economists often call the first of these approaches “quantity regulation,”49 and 
the second two “price instruments.”50 
Most commentators strongly favor price instruments over quantity 
regulation, except in settings where special administrative considerations make 
prices impractical.51 As Kaplow & Shavell show, prices can be used to duplicate 
most of the features of mandates.52 Prices provide vital information to the 
government that regulation supposedly does not.53 Further, prices are said to 
provide for revenues that the government can use for other projects.54 
                                                 
 49 GRUBER, supra note 24, at 137. 
 50 THOMAS STERNER, POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 214–15 (2003). 
 51 GRUBER, supra note 24, at 140; Don Fullerton et al., Environmental Taxes, in DIMENSIONS 
OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 231 (James Mirrlees ed. 2011); Maureen L. Cropper & 
Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 686 (1992); Cameron 
Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice, 22 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 226, 228–29 (2006). As an example of a “special consideration,” price 
instruments may be riskier than quantity regulation when the marginal social damage curve is steep 
but its exact shape is uncertain, GRUBER, supra note 42, at 143–46, and the policy maker cannot 
sharply vary the tax rate to account for this risk. 
 52 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity 
Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7–10 (2002). 
 53 Id. at 4. 
 54 E.g., Helfand et al., supra note 45, at 287; Ian Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement 
Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 52 (1999). 
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B.  Internalities 
Harms done to others are a classic economic rationale for government 
regulation, but what about harms done to self? Most readers likely know that a 
large body of literature now suggests that individuals make decisions—or fail to 
make them—in ways that in the long run likely do not maximize their own 
subjective well-being. 55 Some commenters, seizing on the externality analogy, 
have dubbed these kinds of mistakes “internalities”: costs that the deciding self 
inflicts on its temporal successors.56 
Because a good deal of my later discussion will turn on the details of how 
humans go wrong, it’s worth highlighting some aspects of the empirical literature 
here. One key finding is that we are overwhelmingly creatures of the present, and 
only through exercises of our limited pool of willpower can we force ourselves to 
take sufficient account of the future.57 Relatedly, we tend to focus our attention 
on facts that are readily available to us or on items in plain sight, reacting 
automatically and emotionally to those immediate stimuli.58 The Nobelist Daniel 
Kahneman calls these two modes of reasoning, the unconscious and the 
deliberative, “system one” and “system two,” respectively. Only with some effort 
do we turn our attention to the distant and the hidden, and engage our system two 
reasoning powers to reach better decisions.59 We “anchor” on information we 
have already received, and interpret new data selectively to fit with what we 
already know or want to be true.60 In all of these areas evidence suggests that 
individuals vary considerably in their susceptibility to the behavior.61 
The consequences of these human tendencies can be seen all around us. Few 
human institutions, from families up through the federal government, make 
adequate plans for their financial future.62 We procrastinate or give in to 
                                                 
 55 For reviews, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: 
Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard Decision Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 10–65 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2008); Stefano DellaVigna, 
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009). 
 56 See supra note 28. 
 57 See generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1375–94 (2011); 
Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 162, 166–79 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2007) (providing an overview 
of the literature). 
 58 Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451–57 (2003). 
 59 Id. at 1467–69. 
 60 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 203–24, 263–70 (4th ed. 2008) 
 61 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND 
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 217, 219–20 
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003). 
 62 Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 81, 82–84 (2007). 
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temptation, then build costly structures to overcome our tendencies, and then 
incur even more costs to unwind them.63 People smoke too much, do not exercise 
enough, eat to excess. Many of us, even trained experts, make decisions based on 
only a fraction of the information available to us, choosing poor investments and 
neglecting “hidden” costs that in actuality are easily calculable.64 
 Importantly for my later analysis, evidence so far suggests that some of 
us are more self-aware of these failings than others.65 
C.  Philosophical Foundations & Other Clarifications 
Although there now is extensive evidence that individuals make decisions 
that do not satisfy their own long-run preferences, there has been little scholarly 
analysis of how best to remedy that problem. Debate instead is stuck at a more 
fundamental question: should government be in the business of correcting 
internalities at all? Critics assert that government intervention is unwarranted 
“paternalism.”66 Behind the paternalism label are two deeper critiques: that 
humans should have the autonomy to make their own mistakes, and that 
governments lack the capacity to regulate in ways that will lead to better 
outcomes.67 
The autonomy argument poses difficult philosophical problems that law & 
economics lacks the tools to resolve. For me, law that helps individuals achieve 
their true goals furthers autonomy, rather than undermining it. That, after all, is 
the structure of constitutions: they protect bodies politic from momentary whims 
and passions, and preserve the capacity for long-run self-determination.68 But I 
recognize that some readers will have philosophical commitments that make it 
hard for them to accept this claim. 
                                                 
 63 Frederick et al., supra note 57, at 172–79. 
 64 John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188–243 (2001); Aradhna Krishna et al., A Meta-
Analysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING 101, 101–18 
(2002). 
 65 E.g., Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Third-Party Tax Administration: The Case of Low- 
and Moderate-Income Households, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDIES 963 (2008); Ryan Bubb & Alex 
Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J. PUB. ECON. 39, 53 (2013). 
 66 Richard A. Epstein, Exchange, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2008); see generally Heidi M. Hurd, Fudging Nudging: Why 
Libertarian Paternalism is the Contradiction It Claims It’s Not, 14 GEORGETOWN J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 703 (2016), manuscript at 8. 
 67 Epstein, supra note 66, at 806–07; Joshua D. Wright & Douglas Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
& Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 
1033, 1065–74 (2012); Coons & Weber, supra note 16, at 7–9. 
 68 Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 
1054–55 (2004); see NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 159 (1985) (offering this rationale as a 
justification for so-called paternalistic regulation, despite alleged autonomy concerns). 
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Economics has more to offer in the debate over whether government has the 
capacity to regulate internalities. I will try to resolve these questions in Part III. 
The answers, we’ll see, often depend on just how individuals are failing 
themselves. Therefore, we will first need a brief taxonomy of internalities; Part II 
takes up that task. 
Before that, it is worth offering a few clarifications to the scope of my task. 
One is that, following the prevailing law & economics literature approach to 
cost-benefit analysis, my approach is essentially welfarist.69 I am interested in 
which set of rules maximizes total social welfare, assuming diminishing marginal 
utility and some degree of popular preferences for distributive fairness.70 Of 
course, there could be alternative consequentialist approaches to these same 
questions, such as the suggestion by Sen and Nussbaum that we maximize basic 
human capabilities,71 or perhaps a Rawlsian-inspired approach that would 
maximize health over other outcomes.72 We also could consider deontological 
approaches, such as one that prioritized autonomy or dignity.73 I do not mean to 
suggest these approaches are invalid, but they are not in common use in the 
externality literature. My goal here is to focus first on translating what we already 
know about externalities to internalities. 
Second, it might be objected that some or even most internality problems 
actually present a mix of internalities and externalities.74 What, then, does an 
internality analysis add? My answer is that we can think of the internality as 
offering a reason for more extensive regulation. We just saw that the optimal 
level of regulation depends on the marginal social damage of a product.75 We 
should include both externalities and internalities in calculating the marginal 
social damage.76 This can make a dramatic difference in the regulator’s choices. 
                                                 
 69 Zamir, supra note 27, at 233–35. 
 70 Part III.A. discusses the challenge of measuring welfare when individuals’ observable 
choices do not necessarily reflect their long-term preferences. 
 71 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES 
MEMBERSHIP 69–81 (2006); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39–55 (1992). 
 72 DANIELS, supra note 68, at 42–47; Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health 
Care? The Effect of the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 13 
(1994). 
 73 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 1068–75; Hurd, supra note 66, at 2. 
 74 See Wendy Mariner, Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral Economics: A 
Problematic Combination, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1817, 1833 (2014); cf. Katherine Pratt, A Constructive 
Critique of Public Health Arguments for Antiobesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TULANE L. 
REV. 73, 77–103 (2012) (examining both externality and internality rationales for obesity 
regulation). 
 75 See supra note 46–36. 
 76 Zamir, supra note 27, at 278. To be precise, the government should include the gap 
between the cost of the amount of internality the individual will consume on their own, and the cost 
of the optimal level of consumption, in the social marginal cost. In other words, if some consumers 
can avoid the internality on their own, but not completely avoid it, the price can be lower. 
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For instance, Gruber and Koszegi estimate that the back of the envelope 
externality cost of a pack of cigarettes is less than $1, while the internality cost is 
more like $30.77 If government currently imposes only a small per-pack cost on 
smoking, its decisions about whether and how to correct internalities may 
determine if it will now impose a massive tax hike. 
Finally, I emphasize that my analysis is aimed at genuine failures of 
decision, not simply ignorance of the best choice. Because information often has 
many of the features of a public good—that is, my investment in acquiring 
information produces positive externalities for others I usually cannot charge 
them for—the economic case for government support of information creation is 
straightforward.78 Likewise, when individuals can rely on informed others to act 
for them, we have “rational ignorance,” supplying at least a basic argument in 
favor of regulation.79 Having said that, human limits in absorbing and processing 
information can form an obstacle to good decisions even when the underlying 
information is freely available and individuals have incentives to employ it. 80 
These kinds of failures are within the scope of my analysis here. 
III. MAPPING INTERNALITIES 
To simplify exposition, we can think of individuals’ attitudes towards 
internalities as the product of a two-by-two grid. To distinguish internality 
regulation from the (in my view) easier case of government information 
production, let us assume that full information about the costs and benefits of a 
given choice are freely available to all decision makers. 
Let the first dimension of the grid, C, represent the marginal compliance cost 
perceived by the individual at the time of compliance. I will assume for present 
purposes that this subjective cost of compliance should properly be included in 
the social welfare function. Thus C is the equivalent, in the internality context, of 
                                                                                                                         
Admittedly, this approach does lead to potential difficulties if a given activity produces positive 
externalities and negative internalities. I reserve that case for future development. 
 77 Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, Q.J. 
ECON. 1261, 1291 (2001). 
 78 Janusz Ordover & William Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries, 4 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 13, 14 (1988). On the general theory of public goods, see RICHARD 
CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 79 Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 
491, 495–501 (1981); see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681–85 (1984) (explaining this point, but also 
arguing that private market can substitute for government encouragement in some cases). 
 80 See, e.g., Julie S. Downs et al., Strategies for Promoting Healthier Food Choices, 99 AM. 
ECON. REV. (Papers & Proceedings) 159, 160—62 (2009) (summarizing two studies in which 
disclosing health information had no or perverse effects). 
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the private marginal cost faced by an externality producer for each unit of 
externality. 
The second dimension of the grid can be represented by B, or the subjective 
benefit the individual perceives at the time she must make the decision to comply 
or not. Since compliance or not determines whether the benefit occurs, B is also 
the value the individual assigns to a given government-preferred outcome at the 
time she makes the decision that contributes to that outcome. Also for simplicity, 
for now we will assume that the government’s preference in fact would improve 
the individual’s welfare relative to non-compliance. Under that assumption, B 
measures an individual’s ability to perceive that her current decisions may not 
maximize her overall well-being. For example, she may recognize that she has a 
propensity to undervalue the future. 
Figure One depicts the resulting possibilities, along with some illustrative 
examples. 
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Box 2, the upper right square of the grid, is the baseline case, the “normal” 
person.81 She perceives the costs of complying with the government’s policy as 
low and the benefits as high. In all likelihood, she needs no additional incentive 
to follow the government’s course. 
Individuals in the upper left box, Box 1, do not view the government’s 
suggestion as burdensome, but also do not recognize that its goals are 
worthwhile. This box might capture the empirically well-documented phenomena 
of “inattentive” actors and “reference dependence,” or the importance of framing 
and presentation on how we decide.82 For example, Wansink and others find that 
portion size strongly influences many people’s consumption of food and 
beverages; we eat what is in front of us, without really paying attention to how 
much we’re eating.83 Chetty et al. report evidence that 85% of Danish working 
households were unresponsive to tax incentives for savings, and also did not 
respond to changes in the default amount of savings the government chose for 
them.84 In Kahneman’s terminology, these are “decisions” that are made using 
system one alone.85 
Box 4, the lower-right box, may capture willpower failures, another set of 
well-known behaviors.86 Individuals know what is good for them, but in the 
moment they must make their decision, they find the bad choice too difficult to 
resist.87 We should expect that high-C , high-B individuals will seek out 
“commitment devices,” or tools to help them obtain the beneficial outcome.88 
Whether government intervention is justified to assist these households may 
depend on the extent to which commitment devices are unobtainable, create 
costly side-effects, or have unwanted distributive impacts.89 
                                                 
 81 But see Arcade Fire, Normal Person, on Reflektor (Arista 2013) (“I’ve never really ever 
met a normal person.”). 
 82 Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1451–57. For more in-depth reviews, see B. Douglas 
Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with 
Nonstandard Decision Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 10–5 (Peter 
Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2008); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: 
Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 324–36, 347–56 (2009). 
 83 BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING 17–19, 47–52 (2006); Pierre Chandon, How Package 
Design and Packaged-Based Marketing Claims Lead to Overating, 35 APPLIED ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES & POL’Y 7, 13–18 (2013). 
 84 Raj Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings 
Accounts: Evidence from Denmark, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1141 (2014). 
 85 Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1451–57. 
 86 For surveys, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371,1375–94, and 
Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 162, 166–79 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1278; Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It 
Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 105 (1999). 
 89 Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households 
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Individuals who suffer from various forms of “bounded rationality” may fall 
somewhere near the southeast corner of Box 1 and northwest corner of Box 4.90 
Oftentimes we face problems we lack the cognitive capacity to absorb.91 To 
economize on time and brainpower, we may take mental shortcuts that lead us to 
imperfect answers.92 Accepting the government’s choice might save us from 
having to make our own decision, but if so we do not have a good way to know if 
it’s the best choice for us. Verifying that the government’s suggestion is a good 
one would be somewhat costly, but also establish it as somewhat valuable. Also, 
in some cases it appears that the use of shortcuts is itself motivated by 
procrastination, making these cases a true hybrid.93 
The last, lower-left, box is perhaps the most puzzling. Despite the presence 
of (by hypothesis) full information, individuals here largely ignore the benefits of 
the government’s choice. Remember that we are assuming for now that the 
government’s choice is correct; it is not simply that individuals in this corner 
know their own tastes better. Nonetheless, since they perceive the cost of 
changing their own decision as high, they resist government proposals. This 
might describe the so-called “naïve hyperbolic discounters,” those who are 
impatient but fail to recognize their own impatience.94 
This set of behaviors could also reflect what is sometimes called 
“bolstering,” or “cultural cognition.”95 That is, we tend to selectively filter our 
understanding of the world in ways that reinforce our preferred outcome.96 Since 
the present self wants to feel the wind in its hair, it screens out or rejects as 
“biased” evidence that helmetless motorcyclists die in remarkable numbers.97 
Often the illusion of personal control is an important tool in the process of self-
deception, allowing the actor to distinguish her own case from the statistical 
                                                                                                                         
and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 33, 76–80 (2010). 
 90 Herbert Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (1990). 
 91 Conlisk, supra note 30, at 672. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 14, at 1613–14, summarize the 
evidence in the context of retirement savings. 
 92 RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 3–5 (1994); Kahneman, supra note 58, at 
1458–59. 
 93 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in 
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 125–26 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999); 
Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1468. 
 94 See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. 
ECON. 121 (2001) (developing a model of partially naïve households) 
 95 Dan M. Kahan, Foreword, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems 
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–30 (2011); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and 
Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 632, 632 (1989). 
 96 BARON, supra note 60, at 208–11; George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic 
Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307-09 (1982). 
 97 Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to 
Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 139 (1995). 
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evidence: other people might die of lung cancer, but I can quit whenever I 
want.98 A number of commentators point to these kinds of processes as also 
explaining why many households do not adequately insure against flood and 
other disasters.99 
Again, the taxonomy is meant to be simplifying, and so it likely misses some 
relevant nuance. The boxes are not meant to represent points, but continua. 
Nonetheless, it is a starting place, and I will now argue that it at least in part 
reflects important differences between different potential sets of internalities. 
IV. SHOULD WE REGULATE INTERNALITIES? 
Before we proceed to design issues, I expect that many readers likely want 
some additional convincing that government should regulate internalities at all. 
Again, basic philosophical objections are beyond my scope here. The core of 
many putatively philosophical claims, however, are actually quite practical. For 
example, many self-identified libertarian thinkers object to paternalistic 
regulation because, they claim, the government cannot know individual 
preferences accurately enough to regulate effectively.100 Thus in Part III.A. I will 
address the core of this informational argument against regulating internalities. A 
second common libertarian objection to any regulation is that the possibility of 
private ordering solutions makes government action unnecessary. Part III.B. 
therefore considers whether government regulation of internalities would 
interfere with an efficient private market in internality correction. 
A. The Information Problem 
We saw in Part I.A. that regulators usually need two sets of information in 
order to optimally correct market failures.101 First, they must know the marginal 
harm inflicted by each additional unit of the regulated good. For externality 
goods, this is the damage done to others, while for internalities it is the damage to 
the actor herself. At the same time, government needs to know how socially 
costly it will be to correct the problem: what is the actor’s cost of keeping that 
next ton of carbon out of the air, that Twinkie out of our mouths? 
Early criticisms of “paternalistic” regulation claimed that identifying the 
“harm” of an internality was inconsistent with basic economic methods, 102 but 
                                                 
 98 Suzanne C. Thompson et al., Illusions of Control, Underestimations, and Accuracy: A 
Control Heuristic Explanation, 123 PSYCH. BULLETIN 143, 144–61 (1998). 
 99 Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from 
Hurricane Katrina, 33 J . RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 105-06 (2006). 
 100 See sources cited supra note 67. 
 101 See supra notes 29–45. 
 102 Zamir, supra note 27, at 237–38 (attributing this view to John Stuart Mill). 
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the literature has largely rejected that argument. That is, we usually infer 
marginal benefit from revealed preferences: the consumer faces a price, and if 
she is willing to pay that price, we conclude that her subjective welfare is greater 
than the price she paid.103 
How, then, are we to second-guess consumers’ choices? The answer is 
time.104 By observing individual behavior over time, we can see whether people 
regret some of their own decisions, or take steps (commitments) to prevent 
themselves from making bad choices.105 In this way, we can still rely on revealed 
preferences.106 The concept of an “internality” does not necessarily privilege 
long-run over short-run preferences; we can treat them equally by simply adding 
them up, in effect balancing the revealed value of long-term preferences, such as 
regret and commitment, against the revealed value of momentary, System 1 
preferences.107 But since long-run preferences last much longer, they often will 
greatly outweigh those that last only fleetingly.108 
We can, in other words, think of internalities as simply conflicts between 
internally-conflicting sets of impulses and preferences. Ronald Coase’ 
transaction-cost framework then readily justifies regulation for many kinds of 
internality. Coase argued that government could resolve bargaining problems, 
such as hold-ups and collective action failures, that would otherwise prevent 
private-market solutions for externalities.109 Similarly, we might say that internal-
                                                 
 103 Paul Burrows, Rationality and the Instrumentalist Case for Free Choice, 15 INT’L REV. L 
& ECON. 489, 491 (1995); Daniel M. Haybron & Anna Alexandrova, Paternalism in Economics, in 
Coons & Weber, supra note 13, at 157, 159–60. 
 104 ELSTER, supra note 10, at 5–7, 22; O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1829 n.12. 
 105 Id. (“[F]or any tax policy that takes effect in the future . . . the agent agrees that [the long-
run perspective] is the appropriate welfare function.”). 
 106 Id.; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1875–76; Weiss, supra note 3, at 1305–06; Zamir, supra 
note 27, at 247, 253. Although this point has been well-established for a decade, critics of 
internality correction continue to assert that any internality regulation unfairly privileges long- over 
short-term preferences. E.g., Riccardo Rebonato, A Critical Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism, 
37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 357, 370 (2014). 
 107 Zamir, supra note 27, at 246–47. 
 108 Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, The Political Economy of Sin Taxes, 55 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 575, 578 (2011); B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Toward Choice-Theoretic 
Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 467 (2007). Of course, it 
remains possible that some impulses might be so intense and so frequent that on net the individual 
would be better off if those impulses were not restrained. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A 
Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988). The revealed preference argument does 
not relieve policy-makers of the burden of attempting to measure which outcome increases overall 
welfare. Complicating matters, some short-term preferences might reduce lifespan. If utility during 
the lost period is not accounted for in some way, this might tend to mechanically favor the life-
reducing impulsive conduct. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best 
Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 424, 437–45 (2011) (discussing difficulties of welfare assessments for 
rules that will affect identity of individuals alive in the future). 
 109 Coase, supra note 19, at 13–16. 
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bargaining breakdowns could justify regulation of individuals in Box 1 or Box 3. 
Inattentive individuals do not notice that they are creating conflicts with their 
long-term preferences, making bargaining difficult. Individuals who “bolster” 
using motivated logic refuse to recognize, in the moment, the claims of their 
long-term preferences, much as the problem of double monopoly creates 
bargaining impasses in the externality context.110 Willpower deficiencies present 
a more nuanced case, since there exist private markets that appear to allow for 
intra-personal bargaining. I return to this question in Part III.B. 
Recent critics, such as Yale’s Alan Schwartz, raise the more subtle problem 
that it can be challenging to identify which choices are bad decisions, failures of 
the internal bargaining process.111 Suppose that the same action may be taken 
both by biased actors and the unbiased. Think of an auto insurance policy with a 
high deductible.112 That policy is a good choice for safe drivers, who do not need 
expensive coverage. It’s a bad choice for bad but overconfident drivers: those 
who believe wrongly that they do not need a lot of coverage. Schwartz’s claim is 
that, since we can usually only observe the consumer’s choice to buy a particular 
policy, we cannot know whether that choice produces internalities (the 
overconfident driver) or not.113 
i. Solutions from the Externality Literature 
The information problem is not unique to internality regulation. As we have 
seen, optimal regulation of an externality demands information about both the 
marginal damage or benefit produced by the good as well as the cost curves of 
private actors involved in producing it. Many key choices in modern theories of 
regulation turn on how best to reveal these necessary data.114 
                                                 
 110 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 
293, 306–10 (1992) (describing problems and informational demands of bilateral monopoly). 
 111 PETER CSERNE, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND PATERNALISM 55 (2013); Hill, supra note 20, 
at 445–48; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1377–78. 
 112 I owe this example to Goldin & Lawson, supra note 14, at 441. 
 113 Id. A related claim sometimes raised in the anti-paternalism literature is that government 
regulators, too, can suffer from cognitive biases, or will be subject to market capture in ways that 
reduce their ability to process information. CSERNE, supra note 111, at 52, 54; Wright & Ginsburg, 
supra note 67, at 1063–64. These same difficulties arise in the standard externality setting, Zamir, 
supra note 27, at 280–81, and have standard solutions. For example, notice and comment 
rulemaking in its modern form helps to expose, and incentivizes agencies to limit, these kinds of 
failures. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508–46 (2002). For a more comprehensive empirical 
response to the bias and capture arguments, see Jeremy Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 721, 730–50 (2012). 
 114 Helfand et al., supra note 45, at 251, 287; Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus 
Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S258–59 
(2011). 
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To be sure, not all the tools of externality regulation can be translated 
seamlessly to internalities. Price instruments serve as a favorite tool for revealing 
preferences and private costs,115 but it is uncertain how well they operate for 
irrational actors. If government taxed high-deductible plans, that would screen 
out marginal over-confident drivers, but those that were especially over-confident 
might still make the same choice. That is, the change in price does not 
necessarily tell us whether the choice the consumer reveals is their “true” 
preference or a mistake.116 
Time, another standard component of the externality tool kit, will often still 
perform well, however. Schwartz’s credit contract examples are instances of so-
called “ex ante” regulation—an effort to set policy and enforce it before 
consumers make their choice.117 Many commentators argue that, when 
information is scarce, the better option is an “ex post” regulation.118 That is, we 
wait until after the choice is made, measure the resulting harm or benefit, and 
apply a corresponding price change. Torts are the classic example.119 We cannot 
easily predict which soda drinkers will be most prone to diabetes, and ban or 
limit their soda consumption.120 But we can simply observe which consumers 
develop diabetes later, and allow them to sue to collect compensatory 
damages.121 A rational, forward-looking beverage producer will anticipate the 
possibility of tort liability and act accordingly—although, as I have argued, 
limited liability and other factors may sometimes interfere with that process.122 
We could take an analogous approach to the high-deductible example. For 
example, we might restrict high-deductible plans for individuals who have 
already demonstrated a history of risky driving, or even behaviors we know to be 
highly correlated with risky driving, such as regular alcohol consumption. More 
generally, we can observe what portion of the population that selects high 
deductible plans turns out to be relatively high risk. If the share of those who 
demonstrably made bad choices is high enough, it may still be welfare-improving 
on net to limit those plans, even if the plan would have improved well-being for 
                                                 
 115 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 52, at 4; Fullerton et al., supra note 51, at 430. 
 116 See Galle, supra note 26, at 863–64 (discussing cognitive problems with drawing 
inferences from price instruments). 
 117 Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93 (1977) 
 118 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 490–91 (8th ed. 2011); Jon D. Hanson 
& Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1278 (1998). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigouvian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 
1704–05 (2015). 
 121 Cf. id. at 1705 (suggesting that cure for informational problem is to impose costs on 
obesity, not its predictors). 
 122 Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1734–48 (2015). 
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some drivers.123 
Admittedly, the expedient of switching from ex ante to ex post regulation 
may not work for all kinds of internalities. Many forms of ex post regulation, 
such as the tort suit, require the internality sufferer to recognize, at some point, 
that they have incurred harms.124 This is plausible for Box 1 and Box 4 
consumers—those who were not attentive enough to notice their errors at the 
time, or lacked the willpower to avoid them. These individuals are likely to 
experience regret later. In contrast, Box 3 consumers may deny that their choices 
were wrong, and indeed may even harden their viewpoint further in order to 
avoid the cognitive dissonance that would come with acknowledging contrary 
evidence.125 
In any event, externality theory also shows us that the informational 
demands of regulation for all kinds of internality sufferers can be much lower 
than Schwartz and other critics seem to assume. As William Baumol famously 
argued, sometimes all that we need to know is where we are relative to the 
optimal level of regulation.126 Whatever might be the optimal number of tons of 
greenhouse gas a coal factory can emit, we know that the current level authorized 
in the U.S. is too high.127 We may not be able to identify the level at which there 
would no longer be additional social returns from further reduction. But we know 
we are far from that point and can safely lower emissions somewhat from the 
current, unregulated, level.128 
Similarly, there are many internalities where we have at least this level of 
certainty. Again, economists estimate the internality cost of a pack of cigarettes 
at more than $30, for example.129 Typically, the methodology is to measure the 
                                                 
 123 See Peter Diamond, Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing, 4 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 526, 528–30 (1973) (deriving optimal pigouvian tax when externalities vary 
by consumer); see Zamir, supra note 27, at 266–67 (applying this principle to internalities). 
 124 See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 632–36 (1980–81). 
 125 Eva Jones et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search: An Expansion of 
Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 557, 557 (2001). Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 
145–50 (2007), draws on primary psychological literature to argue that self-defensive bolstering 
can be minimized if new information is introduced within a frame that allows the listener to 
identify some elements that affirm her existing worldview. 
 126 William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
307, 307–08 (1972). 
 127 See James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
49, 53, 64 (2007). 
 128 Id. at 57; see also Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of 
Income Taxation, 53 INT’L ECON. REV. 487, 488 (2012) (arguing that this proposition is always true 
“if a distribution-neutral income tax adjustment is employed” together with the externality 
correction). 
 129 Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1291. 
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unbiased value of “good” outcomes in the general (and presumably unbiased) 
population, and assume that biased actors share that value. Thus Gruber and 
Koszegi, for instance, calculate the cost of smoking by looking at medical costs 
and the average person’s value of additional years of life.130 This assumes, of 
course, that smokers place equal value on long life.131 Maybe that is a plausible 
assumption, but maybe it is not. Still, even if smokers placed only half the value 
on life as others, Gruber’s numbers at least tell us that current cigarette taxes are 
far too low.132 
In my work on the choice between ex ante and ex post regulation, I also 
show that we can reduce the amount of information government needs in order to 
regulate, even ex ante, by using multiple prices or policies.133 The social cost of a 
mistaken policy grows exponentially with the size of the mistake.134 Through 
some simple mathematical simulations, I show that sorting actors into high, 
medium, and low risk categories can be just about as good as having perfect 
information about them.135 Assuming government assigns a regulated party to the 
right category, the size of the error it’s making—the distance, say, between the 
optimal price for that party and the actual price imposed—is smaller than if there 
were only one category, and the social cost accordingly declines exponentially.136 
We do not have to get policy choices exactly right in order for them to be good 
policies. 
This same analysis also undermines Schwartz’s suggestion that law should 
default to an assumption that actors are rational.137 In effect, Schwartz is 
proposing that we set the pigouvian price on internalities to zero, unless we have 
compelling evidence otherwise. But that is a disastrous policy, because it greatly 
increases the average expected distance between the government’s price and the 
optimal. Say that there is a 50% chance that the optimal price is $100. This is no 
different, statistically, than saying that half the population has an optimal price of 
$0 and half $100. In that case, optimal price should be set at $50.138 Even better, 
                                                 
 130 Id. at 1290–91. 
 131 Cf. Thomas Kneisner et al., Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life: 
New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 17 (2009) 
(reporting variations in estimates across income levels). 
 132 Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1292; JONATHAN GRUBER & BOTOND KÖSZEGI, A 
MODERN ECONOMIC VIEW OF TOBACCO TAXATION 17 (2008) (estimating internality-correcting price 
of about $14 per pack). 
 133 Galle, supra note 122, at 1730–34. 
 134 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 52, at 775–79. 
 135 Galle, supra note 122, at 1731–34. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1403–04. 
 138 Allcott & Sunstein, Working Paper, supra note 14, at 17; see Hunt Allcott et al., Energy 
Policy with Externalities and Internalities, 112 J. PUB. ECON. 72, 76 (2014) (modeling argument 
that optimal internality tax is always above zero if any consumer is biased, assuming biases are in 
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if the government has any information about which consumers are more likely to 
need a $100 correction, it should impose a $100 tax on those consumers, and a $0 
tax on others. 
ii.  New Solutions 
In addition to these familiar tools of externality regulation, there also are a 
host of new techniques, many still in development, aimed at the added data 
problems raised by internalities. While these tactics may not cure every 
informational shortfall, they at least free many internality problems from the 
most serious informational obstacles regulators might otherwise face. 
The most familiar of these tools is asymmetric regulation.139 Asymmetric 
regulations are more stringent for those who are most likely to make mistakes.140 
The now-classic example is default savings plans, under which employees must 
actively opt out of making retirement contributions.141 Under-saving for 
retirement seems mostly to be caused by inattention and procrastination.142 These 
are the same individuals who are the least likely to take the time to fill out the 
forms needed to opt out of the default savings plan.143 Meanwhile, active savers 
who prefer lower or different retirement savings will readily fill out the one-page 
form, and so bear little cost from the default.144 Unless even active savers are 
making mistakes, it follows that asymmetric instruments will always be 
preferable to an outright mandate.145 Plan designs that force individuals to decide 
whether to opt in or out can also be asymmetric; for those for whom decisions are 
not burdensome, the cost of deliberation is trivial.146 
Because asymmetric regulation is self-targeting, regulators do not have to be 
able to identify biased consumers.147 The regulation applies to everyone. Since 
                                                                                                                         
one direction). 
 139 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case 
for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1230–37 (2003). 
 140 Id. at 1222, 1225–26; Allcott et al., supra note 138, at 74–75. 
 141 John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings 
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT 167, 187–92 (Jeffrey Brown et al. eds., 2009). 
 142 Id. at 183–84. 
 143 Id. at 188. 
 144 Id.; see Chetty et al., supra note 84, at (reporting that “active savers” were highly 
responsive to changes in incentive savings, implying low transaction costs). 
 145 Goldin & Lawson, supra note 14, at 440. 
 146 Cf. Beshears et al., supra note 141, at 188 (advocating “active choice” savings in some 
settings). 
 147 Camerer et al., supra note 139, at 1222. Bubb and Pildes emphasize that there may be 
more than one dimension of heterogeneity among a regulated population. Bubb & Pildes, supra 
note 14, at 1621–26. The group of passive savers may include individuals who would have 
(eventually) saved more than the default savings rate, such that the default actually lowers savings 
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the cost of non-compliance is so minor for fully rational actors, though, it does 
not change their behavior.148 Therefore regulators can apply it to the whole 
population without worrying much about the risk that it will be misapplied.149 
This same analysis still largely holds if the regulation is more than just a minor 
inconvenience for the rational.150 As I explained, when government can set 
multiple prices or policies, the social cost of imperfectly-informed regulation is 
much lower. Asymmetric regulations are essentially just regulations with 
multiple, built-in prices: a high price for irrational actors, a lower price for the 
fully rational.151 
Other regulatory techniques work by inducing consumers to reveal their 
potential biases, enabling regulators then to target the right policy to the right 
person. A simple example of this “separating equilibrium” approach, discovered 
accidentally by tax officials, is over-withholding.152 Millions of taxpayers each 
year voluntarily allow their employers to withhold more in taxes each pay period 
than required, or opt to receive their tax refund in one lump sum rather than 
incrementally over the year.153 Both qualitative and quantitative studies show that 
taxpayers are, in effect, using the government as a commitment device, forcing 
themselves to save until the time of their tax rebate.154 In general, we should 
expect that these kinds of opt-in regulations will be attractive to individuals in 
Box 4: those who recognize their need for, and who value, interventions to 
                                                                                                                         
for those individuals. Id. at 1622. In my view this is a problem created largely by the use of only a 
single instrument. If government is limited to only one instrument, the default, then there are 
tradeoffs implicit in the setting of the level of default savings. A more efficient approach would be 
to use a second instrument to further sort the inattentive savers between those with high and low 
savings needs. Allcott et al., supra note 138, at 77–78; cf. Ayres, supra note 36, at 2093 (noting 
possible use of multiple defaults for “subsets” of population). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 1225–26. 
 150 See Ayres, supra note 36, at 2089–91. 
 151 Galle, supra note 122, at 1754. Avishalom Tor, The Next Generation of Behavioral Law 
& Economics, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 17, 25–26 
(Klaus Mathis ed. 2015), offers a similar story. Tor explains that legal rules can themselves cause 
“selection” effects, such as when risky rules tend to cause the affected population to be more risk-
seeking. 
 152 Barr & Dokko, supra note 65, at 979; Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, 
and Mental Accounts, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193-95 (1990). 
 153 Damon Jones, Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax 
Refunds, 4 AM. ECON. J.: POL’Y 158, 158 (2012). 
 154 Barr & Dokko, supra note 65, at 979; Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A 
Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 515, 
561–62 (2013); Jones, supra note 153, at 159; Damon Jones, Information, Preferences, and Public 
Benefit Participation: Experimental Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings, 2 AM. 
EC. J.: APPLIED EC. 147, 149 (2010) (reporting reasons the advanced EITC program failed); Ruby 
Mendenhall et al., The Role of Earned Income Tax Credit in the Budgets of Low-Income Earners, 
86 SOC. SERV. REV. 367, 377–78, 382, 398 (2012). 
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bolster willpower.155 
We could probably tell a similar story about Box 1, the inattentive. Many of 
us know that we sometimes fail to pay as much attention as we should to some of 
life’s important details.156 Here, too, there are robust commercial markets for 
self-help devices, providing evidence that indeed some individuals will value 
interventions.157 Our slenderer readers may be unfamiliar with Weight 
Watchers.158 The Weight Watchers “points” system is basically just an easily-
implemented tool for encouraging participants to pay attention to what they eat 
and drink, and to count calories and other nutritional data.159 
A third set of tools, as Schwartz at points acknowledges, is experimentation 
and data crunching.160 Consider, for instance, the possibility that some consumers 
make bad choices because of features of their choice environment, such as in 
studies finding that long menus of Medicare Part D drug coverage options caused 
seniors to pick plans that were clearly dominated by other available choices.161 
Schwartz seems to assume that these situations are hopeless, at least in the case 
where every choice would be rational for some consumers.162 
As Goldin and Reck recently have shown, however, government can design 
experiments that at least would reveal what share of the population’s choice has 
been changed by its framing.163 “Consistent” consumers, whose choice is 
                                                 
 155 Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings 
Device in the Phillipines, 121 Q.J. ECON. 635 (2006); Esther Duflo et al., Nudging Farmers to Use 
Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2350 (2011); see 
also Ashvin Gandhi & Michael Kuehlwein, Reexamining Income Tax Overwithholding as a 
Response to Uncertainty, 43 PUB FIN. REV. 220, 222 (2016) (reporting evidence that rules out most 
plausible rational-actor explanation for overwithholding). 
 156 See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
1145, 1170–74 (2009) (modeling behavior of households aware of their own inattention). 
 157 Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 440 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). A notable data point here is the continuing 
popularity of software that allows us to plan and reminds us of those plans. A number of studies, 
summarized in Brigitte Madrian, Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 6 
ANN. REV. ECON. 663, § 3 (2014), find that planning and reminders improve savings, vaccination 
rates, education performance, vehicle safety, and healthy eating. 
 158 WEIGHT WATCHERS (2018), https://www.weightwatchers.com/us/. 
 159 Our Approach, WEIGHT WATCHERS (2018), https://www.weightwatchers.com/us/our-
approach (“Our new SmartPoints™ plan nudges you toward a healthier pattern of eating so that 
over time, smart choices become second nature”). 
 160 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1380, 1402–03. 
 161 Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence 
from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1195–96, 1198 
(2011); Saurabh Bhargava et al., Chose to Lose? Employee Health-Plan Decisions from a Menu 
with Dominated Options, unpublished manuscript, Nov. 2014, at 21–22. 
 162 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1390–93, 1403 n.54. 
 163 Jacob Goldin & Daniel Reck, Preference Identification Under Inconsistent Choice, 
unpublished manuscript, Mar. 25, 2015, at 7–29. A less technical version of the same argument is 
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unaffected by the frame, presumably are choosing based on some set of invariant 
underlying preferences, and therefore their expressed preferences are reliable 
evidence of their true preferences.164 Government can examine which observable 
features of consistent choosers predict a given set of preferences, and then use the 
same observables to draw inferences about the preferences of inconsistent 
choosers whose preferences cannot be directly measured.165 As I have pointed out 
elsewhere, these same types of tools can also be used to extend experiments of 
limited scope, especially field experiments, to conclusions about the population 
as a whole.166 While it is well known that some cognitive failings are context-
specific or overlapping,167 this is not a reason to reject experimentalism, but 
rather a reason to design experiments so that they will have external validity.168 
Ian Ayres and Quinn Curtis offer the kernel of a similar idea in their recent 
proposal to reform pension savings.169 They suggest that government simply test 
directly for financial sophistication before it allows investors to choose from 
outside the limited default set of investment options.170 It will not always be 
practical or cost-effective to administer individualized testing, especially for 
decisions that must be made quickly or frequently. But the direct-testing idea can 
be implemented for other infrequent, high-stakes choices, such as home 
mortgages, student loans, and health plans. 
Saul Levmore also shows that in some instances the informational demands 
of internality regulation can be low if the causes of internalities are lumpy.171 
That is, suppose the main obstacle to road (or hockey) safety is overcoming the 
present self’s short-term dislike for helmets, which is driven by peer pressure. If 
government requires a helmet, it can then leave to the individual the choice about 
how protective the helmet should be. In other words, the regulator does not have 
                                                                                                                         
Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral Age, 125 YALE 
L.J. 226, 260–69 (2015). 
 164 Goldin & Reck, supra note 163, at 4–5; see also Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings 
and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 229, 240–41 (2014) (considering possibility that data from older generations could be used 
to infer preferences of young savers). 
 165 Id. at 5–6; see also Allcott et al., supra note 138, at 78–79 (suggesting that government 
can at least infer bounds on extent of bias if consumers are fully responsive to prices). 
 166 Galle, supra note 26, at 862–64; see also Raj Chetty, Behavioral Economics and Public 
Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective, 105 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proceedings) 1, 16–19 (2015) 
(explaining how behavioral data can be used to extrapolate policy improvements). 
 167 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1392–95. 
 168 Cf. Sendhil Mullainathan et al., A Reduced-Form Approach to Behavioral Public Finance, 
4 ANN. REV. ECON. 17.1, 17.3 (2012) (laying out a model of cognitive failures that “can be 
interpreted independent of a specific psychological mechanism”). 
 169 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive 
Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1525–29 (2015). 
 170 Id. at 528. 
 171 Levmore, supra note 164, at 234–35. 
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to determine the optimal level of safety equipment, only to identify the fact that 
there is an initial barrier that is preventing many actors from choosing the safest 
level themselves. 
B. Government or Markets? 
Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell and others further argue against 
internality regulation on the ground that it simply crowds out what would 
otherwise have been private responses.172 They point out that government 
regulation of internalities may reduce individual incentives to invest in the power 
to self-regulate, which they call “cognitive hazard.”173 These claims echo the 
classic argument by Ronald Coase that private actors can potentially negotiate 
their way around externalities.174 
As we have seen already, it is not clear the cognitive hazard story makes 
much sense for Box 3 internalities. Confirmation-biased actors by definition 
resist the notion that they are biased at all.175 This may also hold for some Box 1 
individuals: while some inattentive actors are aware and seek out help to 
overcome their own perceived failures, others may not notice their own 
inattention.176 In both these cases individuals would not invest much effort in de-
biasing themselves, whether the government helped or not. 
In other instances there are already private markets for internality correction, 
but government intervention can be justified even when these private markets 
function efficiently.177 One rationale for regulation is a public taste for 
distributive justice.178 We may believe that individuals who have the bad luck to 
                                                 
 172 Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and 
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1626, 1633–41 (2006); CSERNE, supra note 111, at 53; 
Gary Becker & Casey Mulligan, The Endogenous Determination of Time Preferences, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 729 (1997); Epstein, supra note 66, at 811–17. 
 173 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 172, at 1633–41; see also GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING 
FOR TASTES 11 (1996) (arguing that individuals can invest in long-run thinking); Schwartz, supra 
note 31, at 1379 (arguing that government protection is unnecessary when consumers can learn 
from their own mistakes). 
 174 Coase, supra note 39, at 6–15. 
 175 Kahan, supra note 95, at 22–23. 
 176 Cf. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1841 (making this point about willpower 
failures). 
 177 To the contrary, in my view there are good reasons to believe markets for learning are 
frequently imperfect, whether due to limited opportunities for learnings, Bar-Gill & Warren, 
Making Credit Safer, supra note 4, at 7– 25, or other market failings, Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, 
and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 102–03 (2013); see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional 
Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (2007). My argument here holds whether these 
suppositions are ultimately empirically supported or not. 
 178 Concerns for justice are consistent with my welfarist framework, since welfarism aims to 
maximize the satisfaction of all preferences, including society’s preferences for fairness. MATTHEW 
D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 23 (2006); Louis 
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suffer from internalities should not be left worse off than others.179 Many 
commentators offer similar theories for providing affordable health insurance 
regardless of economic need: women and individuals with disabilities, for 
instance, should not be worse off economically than men, simply because their 
health costs are on average higher.180 
Obliging internality sufferers to turn to private-market solutions will often 
leave them worse off because private help is not free. Self-education is difficult 
and often impractical.181 In many cases, private market solutions may allow the 
solution provider to extract all or nearly all of the “surplus,” or benefit, from 
customers.182 For example, employers who provide pensions help workers to 
overcome the workers’ failure to save adequately for retirement. In addition to 
sacrificing some salary for this benefit, workers also take on the agency costs 
inherent in entrusting their bargaining adversary–the employer–with their own 
well-being.183 
Even worse, private markets may extract consumer surplus without 
necessarily overcoming consumers’ internalities. Another lesson from studies of 
tax withholding is that after households engage in costly commitment devices, 
they later backslide and, when tempted, spend more money trying to accelerate 
the very payments they voluntarily delayed.184 These de-commitment services, 
known as “refund anticipation loans” in the tax refund context, are often subject 
to enormous fees.185 Thus, as other commentators have observed, the possibility 
that private markets can both offer and undo self-commitments can be a reason 
                                                                                                                         
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 989–92 (2001). 
 179 SHLOMI SEGALL, HEALTH, LUCK, JUSTICE 100–04 (2010); Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, 
You Want Insurance With That? Using Behavioral Economics to Protect Consumers from Add-on 
Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 43 (2013); cf. DANIELS, supra note 68, at 161–62 
(suggesting that inequality of information about health risks can warrant regulation of those risks). 
 180 SEGALL, supra note 179, at 74–86, 101; Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 945, 1352–67 (2002); see also Zamir, supra note 27, at 282–83 (offering this 
rationale in defense of paternalistic regulation more generally). 
 181 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 4, at 26–55, and Galle, supra note 177, at 104–05, survey 
the evidence. 
 182 See Galle & Utset, supra note 89, at 54–55 (describing this phenomenon in the consumer 
credit context). 
 183 Christine Jolls, Employment Law and the Labor Market, NBER Working Paper No. 
13230, at 4 (2007); Brendan Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
1257, 1296–1303 (2015). 
 184 See Barr & Dokko, supra note 65, at 980; Jonathan Parker, Why Don’t Households 
Smooth Consumption? Evidence from a 25 Million Dollar Experiment, NBER Working Paper No. 
21369 (July 2015) (reporting that borrowing to accelerate refunds is most strongly correlated with 
measures of household impatience). 
 185 Barr & Dokko, supra note 65, at 979; Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Nat’l Consumer Law 
Ctr., Inc., Consumer Fed’n of Am., Coming Down: Fewer Refund Anticipation Loans, Lower 
Prices from Some Providers, but Quickie Tax Refund Loans Still Burden the Working Poor 4, 8–12 
(2008). 
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for government action.186 
Even if private providers do not extract most of the benefits of internality 
correction, government provision of commitment devices and the like can be an 
efficient source of redistribution because it resembles an improved version of the 
income tax. In standard public finance accounts of the tax system, government 
can improve over a simple tax on labor earnings if it can identify and tax things 
that are correlated with the ability to earn income.187 Briefly, the reasoning is that 
in a progressive tax system, individuals with high earning potential may “mimic” 
low-income individuals in order to escape high tax rates; taxing correlates of 
income rather than income itself makes this mimicking more difficult.188 
Free internality correction fits into this story. The same logic behind taxing 
correlates of income also justifies government provision of in-kind benefits, if 
those benefits are disproportionately useful to individuals with lower earning 
potential.189 Many of the key building blocks of internalities, such as impatience, 
inattention, and addictive behaviors, have been shown to correlate with lower 
income.190 Internality correction therefore closely resembles an efficient 
supplement to the income tax. 
Finally, Klick & Mitchell do not consider the possibility that government 
support could encourage private self-help investments. Government support 
might, for example, increase the returns to investment: I might invest more effort 
in learning to rely on commitment devices if the devices available are cheap and 
effective.191 Absent government assistance, some individuals might be too 
demoralized to make use of commitment or procrastinate learning how to do 
                                                 
 186 David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997); 
O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1841. 
 187 This insight is usually traced to James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis, 6 J. 
PUB. ECON. 327 (1976), and the earlier work by Mirrlees discussed therein. 
 188 Emanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income 
Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217, 226, 228 (2002). 
 189 LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 227 n.10 (2008); 
Helmuth Cremer & Phillipe Pestieau, Redistributive Taxation and Social Insurance, 3 INT’L TAX & 
PUB. FIN. 281, 282 (1996); Jean-Charles Rochet, Incentives, Redistribution, and Social Insurance, 
16 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INSURANCE THEORY 143, 160–64 (1991). 
 190 For evidence on impatience, see James J. Heckman et al., The Rate of Return to the 
Highscope Perry Preschool Program, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 114 (2010); Walter Mischel et al., Delay of 
Gratification in Children, 244 SCIENCE 933 (1989); Brian C. Cadena & Benjamin J. Keys, Human 
Capital and the Lifetime Costs of Impatience, 7 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 126 (2015). For 
salience, see Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience 
and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 302 (2013). For addiction, see, e.g., Karen M. 
Jennison, The Short-Term Effects and Unintended Long-Term Consequences of Binge Drinking in 
College: A 10-Year Follow-Up Study, 30 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 659 (2009), or watch a 
few episodes of The Wire. 
 191 Cf. Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1284 (arguing that knowledge of a future price 
increase may help motivate addicts to quit addictive behavior before price increase). 
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so.192 In essence, regulation serves as a commitment matching grant, multiplying 
the public’s investments. 
V. CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS: CARROT, STICK, OR COMPROMISE? 
Assuming that officials have committed to regulating internalities, how 
should they do it? Should we ban dangerous drugs? Tax them? Subsidize 
alternatives and treatments? Or oblige producers to print visceral and frightening 
images of the drugs’ consequences on the side of each package? These choices 
among regulatory options or “instruments” is a central question for modern 
regulation.193 
I have argued before that there are four basic categories of regulatory 
instrument.194 Two of the categories involve explicit transfers of wealth, while 
the other two do not.195 If government selects an instrument that transfers wealth, 
it must decide whether the regulated party will, relative to the pre-existing 
baseline, be made to pay for non-compliance (a “stick”) or be rewarded for 
compliance (a “carrot”).196 The transferless categories include standard 
“command and control” regulation, such as bans or caps on production.197 Many 
nudges resemble command and control regulation, in that they also do not 
involve any explicit wealth transfer.198 But other features of the nudge are so 
different and, as Sunstein and Thaler say, “surprising,” from a classical rational-
actor perspective,199 that I put them in a fourth category by themselves. 
As we saw briefly in Part I.A., there now is a considerable literature 
examining the factors that officials should consider when they choose between 
these classes of instrument. Instruments may differ, among other ways, in their 
propensity to create moral hazard, in their effects on demand for the regulated 
product, in their impact on the public fisc, and in their distributive fairness.200 
While economists often favor wealth-transfer instruments over others,201 the 
                                                 
 192 See Galle & Utset, supra note 89, at 76–78 (introducing the concept of “meta-
procrastination” and discussing its sources and implications). 
 193 Helfand et al., supra note 45, at 249–53. 
 194 Galle, supra note 26, at 848–54. I actually simplify my earlier categories a bit here for the 
sake of narrative economy. A more complete categorization would also include the division 
between ex ante and ex post and would sub-divide price instruments into priced (those denominated 
in dollars) and transfer (those that shift resources). Transfer instruments can be even further refined 
to distinguish between public and private transfers. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 851. 
 197 Id. at 848–49. 
 198 Id. at 846–47. 
 199 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 85–86, 252–54. 
 200 Galle, supra note 26, at 848–53. 
 201 Helfand et al., supra note 45, at 287; Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 150 (2006); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 52, at passim. 
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choice between carrot and stick typically obliges us to trade off favorable results 
on some of these factors against unfavorable outcomes on others, implying that 
sometimes a reason to choose a transferless instrument is that it may represent a 
compromise position.202 
Although prior literature has extensively considered these factors in the 
externality context, it has not to my knowledge examined the extent to which the 
received wisdom applies to internalities. This Part begins that task.203 
A. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is usually the strongest argument against carrots.204 When 
government offers rewards to polluters to stop their misdeeds, it encourages new 
polluters to begin emitting so that they, too, can be paid to stop.205 The 
underlying game theory logic is similar to the rationale of the United States 
government when it refuses to pay ransom to kidnapers.206 In contrast, the 
promise of future liability encourages polluters to invest in pollution-reduction 
technologies, especially if liability may turn out to be retroactive;207 rewards 
provide no incentive to remedy harm before the reward is paid, and may crowd 
out any voluntary compliance.208 Even when distributional concerns might weigh 
in favor of carrots,209 the possibility of these kinds of moral hazard strongly 
counsels in favor of at least partial stick liability for externality producers.210 
                                                 
 202 Galle, supra note 26, at 872–79. 
 203 I emphasize “begin.” A work of this length necessarily must omit many considerations, 
some potentially important. For example, the form of regulation may affect compliance and the 
public’s relation to the law. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Behavioral Tradeoffs: Beyond the Land 
of Nudges Spans the World of Law and Psychology, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE 336, 342–50 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015). Private actors who 
profit from consumers may respond to government interventions and understanding how these 
responses might vary across instruments is an important future direction for researchers. Cf. Ran 
Spiegler, On the Equilibrium Effects of Nudging, 44 J. LEGAL STUDIES 389 (2015) (offering formal 
models of firm responses to several nudges). 
 204 Coase, supra note 39, at 42; Wiener, supra note 35, at 726 & n.186. 
 205 Id. For qualifications to this story, see Galle, supra note 35, at 822–23. 
 206 See ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN TO 
FIGHT 7 (2010). 
 207 Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 1663 
(1993). 
 208 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 212 
(2d ed. 1988) (1975). 
 209 Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of 
Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 363–65 (2013). 
 210 In essence, a partial stick is similar to a government co-pay requirement on its social 
insurance policy, and is efficient for similar reasons: it trades off the worst of moral hazard against 
only a small loss on redistribution. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, Social Insurance: Connecting 
Theory to Data, in V HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 112, 157–58 (Alan J. Auerbach et al. eds., 
2012). 
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This version of the moral hazard argument seems tenuous when it comes to 
internalities. A rational actor cannot credibly kidnap themselves.211 Nor would it 
make sense to delay self-help in order to encourage government payment, unless 
somehow the individual expects that the government will greatly over-pay. 
Admittedly, carrots could contribute to moral hazard at the margins. 
Government interventions of all kinds can encourage risky behavior, as Klick & 
Mitchell emphasize.212 If I know that a soda tax will help motivate me to 
eliminate any soft drink habit, I may be more willing to take the first sip. If I 
expect instead to be paid to switch to bottled water, my calculus perhaps tips a bit 
further towards downing that initial Coke. Rewards might also impact timing. A 
newly-introduced carrot might encourage “sophisticated” high-beta consumers to 
wait to kick their bad habit until the government assistance arrives, while a new 
tax would encourage quitting before the tax.213 
For now, though, the possible absence of significant incremental moral 
hazard from carrots is enormously important to internality regulation. With moral 
hazard out of the way, the choice between carrot and stick is much closer.214 
Carrots for internalities deserve serious consideration.215 Let’s continue a bit 
further in that direction. 
B. Income Effects 
As other writers recognize, income effects can be important in the choice of 
regulatory instrument.216 Income effects are the just the tendency of most 
consumers to demand more of a good when they have more money. A relatively 
unusual exception is the so-called “inferior” good, which is a good that people 
tend to want less when their wallet is fatter; ramen noodles may be a familiar 
                                                 
 211 But see Other People’s Money (1991). 
 212 See supra notes 172–176. 
 213 Cf. Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1273–77 (finding that smokers are responsive to 
anticipated future tax increases). It also is possible that some interventions may be more likely to 
cause crowding out of private effort than others. For example, maybe resentment towards fines 
imposed on helmetless riders tends to strengthen confirmation bias among motorcycle riders, 
making them even more resistant to news about the dangers of riding. This is another area where 
better empirical evidence would be useful. 
 214 Galle, supra note 26, at 878. 
 215 My analysis of carrots here is limited to what I’ll call traditional carrots, those that have 
no unexpected impacts on decisions. It may be possible to use rewards as the centerpiece of a 
“surprising” regulatory intervention, in which the behavioral impact is far larger than we would 
expect given the size of the reward. See Kevin Volpp et al., Financial Incentive-Based Approaches 
for Weight Loss, 300 JAMA 2631, 2631–36 (2008) (describing effectiveness of constant stream of 
very small but immediate rewards in changing the behavior of present-biased actors). Since the 
fiscal costs of these approaches is typically quite small, I will group them with nudges and other 
transfer-less instruments. 
 216 STERNER, supra note 50, at 167. 
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example to college-educated readers. Proponents of soda taxes note that because 
of income effects, subsidies for healthy alternatives could have a perverse 
impact.217 By enriching a household, subsidies may also increase its demand for 
all consumables, including unhealthy food. This shift implies a higher optimal 
subsidy, as when consumers are more reluctant to give up their junk food, 
government suasion must be more powerful.218 
The opposite is true if government uses sticks rather than carrots, or if 
government uses carrots but the internality-creating item is an inferior good. In 
those cases, income effects will depress consumption, allowing for a lower 
optimal tax or subsidy rate. 
Regulation of internalities may also change a household’s perception of its 
own wealth, but this is unlikely to affect the choice of instruments analysis. If we 
can achieve the same internality correction in any of three ways (carrot, stick, or 
transfer-less instrument), presumably any income effect that comes with 
internality correction will be the same under each.219 For example, helping 
families save for retirement might make them feel richer; since consumption is a 
normal good, that feeling of greater wealth might increase current expenditures at 
the cost of savings.220 But this effect would be equally true whether we penalize 
non-savers or reward savers. It is only the incremental income effects that result 
from the carrot/stick choice that factor into which of those options we would 
want. 
Of course, that would not be true if our choice of instrument also affected 
how individuals perceive the benefit of internality-correction. For instance, we 
saw before that inattentive eaters might not be aware that a “nudge” has changed 
their eating habits. They might be somewhat more cognizant of monetary 
rewards, leading them to better understand that they now are making better use of 
their money (and therefore are effectively richer). I explore the relation between 
salience and income effects in more detail elsewhere.221 
Ultimately, then, the importance of income effects is hard to predict without 
more empirical evidence. There is some suggestion already that “junk” food and 
                                                 
 217 Gideon Yaniv et al., Junk-Food, Home Cooking, Physical Activity and Obesity: The Effect 
of the Fat Tax and the Thin Subsidy, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 823, 826–27 (2009). 
 218 See KAPLOW, supra note 128, at 496–97 (analyzing impact of income effects on optimal 
pigouvian tax). Of course, when government increases the optimal subsidy, it further worsens the 
income effect, and so on. But typically, the substitution effect of the subsidy is more powerful than 
the income effect, and so this iterative sequence converges to a solvable optimum. 
 219 See Louis Kaplow, Myopia and the Effects of Social Security and Capital Taxation on 
Labor Supply, NBER Working Paper No. 12452, at 7 (Aug. 2006) (discussing of the potential 
income effects of improving a household’s inter-temporal budget allocation). 
 220 See GRUBER, supra note 45, at 650 (stating that income effects tend to reduce savings 
because present consumption is a normal good). 
 221 Galle, supra note 177, at 66–67, 86–89, 93. 
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cigarettes might be inferior goods, at least in the contemporary United States.222 
If other internality-creating choices are also inferior goods, then the argument for 
carrots becomes much stronger. In that case, the income effect of the carrot 
boosts, rather than undermines, the substitution effect of the price instrument. If 
not, alternatives such as sticks or transferless instruments look better by 
comparison, unless it were the case that carrots had particularly low income-
salience. 
C. Revenues 
Another central issue in the choice of instruments is the instrument’s effect 
on the public fisc. Carrots, of course, must be paid for.223 Carrots aside, in most 
of the prior literature, the fact that some instruments provide funds that can be 
transferred to others in large measure explains the dominance of “price,” or what 
I have called “transfer,” instruments, over other choices.224 
O’Donoghue & Rabin suggest that internalities present an especially strong 
example, going so far as to argue that Pigouvian-type taxes on internalities can be 
justified solely from a revenue perspective.225 This was an argument that, in the 
pollution context, had been known in the 1990’s as the “revenue recycling” or 
“double dividend” claim: the possibility that carbon taxes both could clean the 
environment and also raise money more efficiently than other sources.226 Allcott 
& Sunstein assert, without reference to O’Donoghue & Rabin, that there is a 
double dividend from taxing internalities, but as we’ll see the story is rather more 
complicated.227 
The availability of a double dividend is, fittingly, important to my analysis 
for two reasons. For one, a double dividend would offer a reason to impose a tax 
on internalities, regardless of whether we otherwise believe internality regulation 
is a good idea: sin taxes would just be a particularly good way to raise money. 
The other significance of the double dividend is that it represents an opportunity 
cost if policy makers choose to use command and control regulation or nudges, 
                                                 
 222 R.J. DeGrandpre et al., Effects of Income on Drug Choice in Humans, 59 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL ANAL. BEHAVIOR 483, 483 (1993) (generic cigarettes); Leonard H. Epstein et al., 
Purchases of Food in Youth: Influences of Price and Income, 17 PSYCH. SCIENCE 82, 88 (2006) 
(junk food); Matthew Harding & Michael Lovenheim, The Effect of Prices on Nutrition: 
Comparing the Impact of Product- and Nutrient-Specific Taxes, 53 J. HEALTH ECON. 53 2017) 
(junk food). 
 223 Madrian, supra note 157, at § 2. 
 224 See sources cited supra note 201. 
 225 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1829, 1832–33. 
 226 E.g., Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes 
and Subsidies in the Presence of Externalities: A Computational General Equilibrium Approach, 
62 J. PUB. ECON. 199, 200 (1993). 
 227 Allcott & Sunstein, Working Paper, supra note 14, at 8. 
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rather than taxes or other transfer instruments. 
i. Is There a Double Dividend? 
To understand O’Donoghue and Rabin, we first have to review briefly why 
it is that environmental economists came to mostly reject the “double dividend” 
theory. In brief, as Bovenberg & Goulder summarize in their handbook entry, the 
problem is that carbon taxes are differentiated consumption taxes.228 As a result, 
carbon taxes are likely not only to distort consumers’ choice of what to buy, but 
also to affect the after-tax return on labor income. That is, since we generally 
work in order to buy stuff, taxes on the stuff itself affects not only our choice 
about what to buy but also our labor/leisure decisions.229 While carbon taxes may 
have some desirable effects, they also frustrate some consumers’ preferences for 
high-carbon goods, and discourage labor supply.230 
Boiling Bovenberg & Goulder’s more complex calculations down into a 
simple equation, the effect of a carbon tax is: 
E – C – L + R 
where E is the gains from carbon reduction, C the loss from consumers’ choice to 
switch to a second-best product, L the compensated labor-supply impact, and R 
any available gains from cutting other distorting taxes.231 
This equation implies that pollution taxes are usually a less efficient revenue 
source than the income tax. Set aside E for now; these environmental gains can 
                                                 
 228 A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in 
3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1471, 1486–1507 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002) 
 229 Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus 
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 56 (1976) 
 230 Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 228, at 1500. 
 231 We could also write a slightly more complicated version of the formula, with the added 
complexity perhaps justified by the fact that this version captures an important nuance. This more-





Here, C and L stand for something a bit different: instead of the total welfare loss, they are the total 
loss, in dollars, caused by the tax’s distortive effects. These losses are spread out over a population, 
p, which differs for each factor depending on the incidence of that factor. To translate the dollar 
loss into a utility loss, we divide the dollars by the square of the population that experiences the 
dollar loss. This reflects, roughly, the basic proposition in tax economics that the deadweight loss 
of a tax rises in proportion to the square of its rate: small taxes do not inconvenience us much, but 
large taxes motivate ever-larger distortions in our behavior. By spreading a burden out over more 
people, we reduce its per-capita impact, effectively cutting the rate. This burden-spreading point is 
important to Bovenberg & Goulder. For them, it helps to explain why R can never offset C and L. 
By bringing in carbon-tax revenue, the government can cut the income tax by the same amount, 
producing a beneficial effect R/𝑝𝑅
2. But the income tax affects many more people than will be 
impacted by at least some forms of carbon pricing. R and L are equal, by definition. If pR is much 
greater than pL , the R/𝑝𝑅
2 term will always be smaller than L/𝑝𝐿
2. 
37
Galle: The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:1 (2018) 
38 
be achieved through non-tax policies. Bovenberg and Goulder argue that L and R 
will at best cancel each other out, because the carbon tax, like the income tax, 
discourages labor supply.232 Since L and R each involve identical dollar amounts, 
the result is that the carbon tax is strictly worse than the income tax by the 
amount of the distortion, C.233 
O’Donoghue and Rabin in essence point out that this result does not hold for 
internalities when taxes are too small to create any effects on labor supply.234 By 
definition, correction of the internality on net improves consumer welfare, at 
least from the point of view of the government planner.235 If there are negligible 
labor-supply effects, we could write the resulting equation as: 
U = I – C + R 
where I replaces E as gains from the government policy, and by assumption I – C 
is always positive. That seems quite intuitive; O’Donoghue and Rabin’s main 
contribution is to show that it sometimes is plausible one could achieve 
meaningful changes in behavior with taxes that are too small (in their total 
burden, not necessarily their rate) to affect labor/leisure decisions.236 
But what about when internality-correcting taxes must be large in this sense? 
Cigarette taxes, for example, can consume a meaningful fraction of household 
income for low-income families.237 In many cases, it is not convincing to ignore 
potential labor-supply (or other tax-avoidance) effects. 
A 2006 article by Louis Kaplow provides some starting points for our 
analysis.238 Kaplow analyzes the labor-supply effects of an actuarially fair social 
                                                 
 232 Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 228, at 1500. 
 233 Id. at 1501–02. 
 234 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1834–35. 
 235 Id. at 1829; see also Haavio & Kotakorpi, supra note 108, at 575. 
 236 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1836–38. Another contribution the pair offer is 
that internality-correcting taxes can be efficient even if the population is heterogeneous, such that 
taxes in some cases are falling on individuals with no internality at all. The intuition is that taxes on 
rational actors, if “small,” are relatively non-distorting, because at the margin the rational actor is 
indifferent between her two options; if taxes change her choice, the welfare loss is correspondingly 
small. That is, the contribution of rational actors to C in my formula is minor. At the same time, 
because internality sufferers are far from their private optimum, small changes can produce large 
welfare gains (due to the exponential relationship between deadweight loss and the size of the 
error). Thus, I will generally be quite large relative to C. See also Mullainathan et al., supra note 
168, at 17.16–17.17 for a slightly more elaborate model of the same idea. 
 237 See Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Tax Incidence When Individuals Are Time-
Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1962 (2004) (estimating 
that smoking consumes about 3% of the budget of households in the bottom quartile of income); 
Gary Lucas, Saving Smokers from Themselves: The Paternalistic Use of Cigarette Taxes, 80 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 693, 693 (2012) (estimating that a New York pack-a-day smoker pays $2,500 per 
year). 
 238 Kaplow, supra note 219. Portions of the 2006 paper were published as Louis Kaplow, 
Targeted Savings and Labor Supply, 18 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 507 (2011). As the working paper 
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security system.239 He shows that the labor-supply effects of compelled savings 
for retirement may depend on taxpayer beliefs about whether their own savings 
decisions are optimal.240 Let us consider that point in the context of the four 
boxes I set out in Part II. 
Of the internality examples I have examined so far, Box 3 of Fig. One most 
closely resembles the standard externality case sketched by Bovenberg & 
Goulder. These are individuals, again, who perceive change as costly now and 
see little long-term benefit to compliance. Think of a tobacco tax. Individuals 
who change their tobacco consumption habits are likely to experience that shift 
as very costly. Further, individuals who believe that they do not face major long-
term costs of smoking will perceive themselves as obtaining a lower utility for 
each dollar of earnings, potentially diminishing labor supply or shifting labor to 
less-productive uses. At the same time, there are revenue gains from the tax, and 
the policy planner recognizes that there is in fact a long-run internality health 
gain for the individual, yielding the simple equation: 
 U = I – C – L + R (Eq. 1) 
This of course is the same as Bovenberg & Goulder’s equation, with 
internalities replacing externalities. 
Now consider Box 4, where individuals have high B and also high C. 
Imagine, for instance, the reaction to an alcohol tax by an actress we could call 
“Lindsay,” who recognizes her alcohol dependence but lacks the willpower to 
end it.241 Lindsay would experience the loss of her morning whiskey as a drop in 
her short-run wellbeing, even while she recognizes that there are long-run gains 
from abstaining. To the extent she does not climb fully onto the sobriety wagon, 
government would have revenue from taxing alcohol. 
What is the effect on Lindsay’s labor supply? As in Kaplow’s story of the 
social security tax, arguably Lindsay should recognize that the government, by 
improving the way in which she has chosen to allocate her spending, has on net 
increased her returns to labor.242 This effect should at least partly counteract the 
labor-discouraging impact of the tax, and might even on net increase her labor.243 
                                                                                                                         
version includes much more extensive discussion of several subjects of interest here, citations are 
to the original. 
 239 Id. at 4–13. Daniel Shaviro, Multiple Myopias, Multiple Selves, and the Undersaving 
Problem, NYU Law & Economics Working Paper No. 382 (Aug. 2014), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1386&amp;context=nyu_lewp, considers a similar 
case but relaxes the assumption of actuarial fairness. 
 240 Kaplow, supra note 238, at 12–13. 
 241 Any resemblance of our anecdote to any real individuals, living or dead, is strictly 
coincidental. 
 242 Kaplow, supra note 238, at 7. 
 243 Lindsay may also be able to work more as a result of her greater sobriety. Some portion of 
that improvement should be reflected in the I term in our equation. There may also be externality 
39
Galle: The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:1 (2018) 
40 
At the same time, there are income effects that point in the opposite direction 
from the substitution effects. For example, since Lindsay is poorer as a result of 
the liquor excise, she will have to work harder in order to pay her rent. 
Conventionally, analyses of the labor impact of taxation omit this effect, because 
by assumption the consumer is “compensated” by the use of the tax to pay for 
public goods, which offset the loss of individual wealth.244 But there is no such 
compensation for another kind of income effect Lindsay experiences. When the 
government helps her to set her priorities in order, she in effect is wealthier: by 
incentivizing her to spend less money on booze, government gives her more 
money to pay rent.245 Since she now has more money available to pay rent, the 
government’s assistance should tend to diminish her labor supply.246 
By adding subscripts to the labor component to reflect the differing impact 
of the two competing substitution effects and the income effect, we could write 
the resulting social welfare calculation. Let Lsb represent labor supply responses 
from those who see the tax as benefitting their own well-being, and Lst as the 
traditional labor-supply impacts of a tax. Li will be the labor impact of the income 
effect. Then we have: 
 U = I – C + Lsb – Lst – Li + R (Eq. 2) 
Equation 2 implies that there is some possibility of a double dividend from 
taxing internalities of this kind. Even setting aside I, it is possible that the 
remaining terms net out to a positive, implying that there would be social gains 
from using the Pigouvian tax to replace other sources of revenue.247 Whether this 
is so in the real world would depend on the relative labor gains and losses from 
better allocating consumers’ budgets. 
Box 1 offers an even stronger case for double dividends. Recall that these 
individuals tend not to notice either changes in their behavior or to contemplate 
the long-run effects of those changes. What is the effect of a tax on inattentive 
behaviors? 
Changes to the behavior of the inattentive may have minimal effects on 
                                                                                                                         
benefits for others from Lindsay’s efforts. But for simplicity I will focus on the pure internality 
case. 
 244 GRUBER, supra note 24, at Ch. 21. 
 245 Kaplow, supra note 238, at 9; cf. Chetty et al., supra note 156, at 1173–74 (exploring 
possible income effects of improved allocation of resources for irrational consumers). 
 246 Some impulsive individuals may be particularly bad at planning their household finances. 
These actors—and actresses, in some cases—might not be as careful in matching labor supply to 
their needs or desires. If so, changes in their effective income may not produce expected labor-
supply effects. Cf. Chetty et al., supra note 156, at 1173–74 (discussing how household’s ability to 
allocate resource decisions affects social planner’s welfare calculation). 
 247 Given the possibility of private “commitment devices” for individuals in Box 4, the social 
planner may prefer to calculate I as the incremental gains, if any, from public provision. 
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either consumer welfare or labor supply.248 If I have little idea how much soda I 
drank, it is unlikely that I will perceive changes in that amount as affecting my 
short-run well-being.249 And, since I am unaware that anything meaningful has 
changed, I have no reason to adjust my labor supply. Of course, it is also quite 
possible that incentives that depend on conscious responses, such as tax or tax 
incentives, also will not do much to change my behavior, producing little 
internality gain,250 but that would make them potentially a very effective source 
of revenue.251 In the best-case scenario, assuming minimal consumption losses or 
labor effects, but modest internality gains (for instance, because consumers are 
more attentive to price than they are to portion size) we could write the welfare 
effects of the tax on inattentive consumers as: 
 U = I + R (Eq. 3) 
which would represent an unambiguous double dividend.252 
On the other hand, taxes aimed at the highly inattentive could also be highly 
inefficient, depending on how they are designed and how taxpayers respond. For 
example, repealing existing tax incentives for retirement savings might be 
perceived by inattentive savers as an increase in the tax on labor.253 A tax on non-
savers could be similarly ineffective, if inattentive savers are attentive to labor 
taxes. The penalty would distort labor income as much as any other income tax, 
but if the non-savers do not know why they’re being punished it may not change 
                                                 
 248 Galle, supra note 26, at 867–68. 
 249 See ELSTER, supra note 10, at 8 (noting that inattentive agents cannot respond to 
incentives); Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1451 (“The operations of System 1 . . . are difficult to 
control or modify”). 
 250 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1835; Shaviro, supra note 239, at 34–43. For a 
survey of the evidence on taxpayer responsiveness to “low-salience” taxes, see Galle, supra note 
177, at 63–67; David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience 
and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 26–53 (2011). 
 251 Usually, the welfare loss from a “hidden” tax of this kind is that the consumer obtains a 
different basket of goods than she would have purchased had she been aware of the tax. Chetty et 
al., supra note 156, at 1173. By assumption here, the consumer does not have clearly defined 
preferences for the amount of the internality good. But the tax would reduce her consumption of 
other goods, to an extent she likely would not have chosen if she were aware of the tax. Consumers 
may be able to minimize these distortions if they notice their shrinking budget and can re-optimize 
purchases accordingly. Id. at 1174. So, while labor distortions are lessened, there may still be 
welfare losses from this misallocation of the taxpayer’s budget. If so, we should add a – C term, 
which would make the case for a double dividend ambiguous. 
 252 Kaplow, supra note 238, at 8 & n.10, appears to tell a similar possible story about 
willpower failures. He suggests that, if workers wrongly believe at the time they set labor effort that 
the government will not impose any commitments on them, there will be no labor supply effects. 
But unlike the inattention story I describe, there is no known empirical evidence of this behavior. In 
a more realistic setting in which labor supply is constantly being decided, it is unclear how long 
workers could persist in their mistaken beliefs about the government’s response. At some point, 
Kaplow’s willpower story becomes an inattention story. 
 253 Kaplow, supra note 238, at 1–2. 
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behavior in the desired direction. More research on these issues would be 
welcome. 
In sum, whether an internality-correcting tax provides a double dividend 
depends on the nature of the mental processes that affect consumer choice. 
Further complicating the analysis, there may be a mix of processes that produce 
similar outcomes. Some smokers may fall into Box 3, others in Box 4; that is, 
some may want help to quit, while others believe they do not need to “right 
now.” 
Optimal policy choice then may depend on government’s ability to correctly 
identify the mix of each. This task may not be as daunting as it sounds. For 
example, we expect that individuals in Box 4 will accept commitment devices 
where available (barring, say, ideological objections to accepting any help from 
the government), while individuals in the other boxes would not. This difference 
allows government to establish policies that induce individuals in Box 4 to reveal 
their type. 
ii. Double dividends and choice of instruments 
Assuming that in some cases there may be a double dividend, let’s look at 
how that possibility would affect the government’s choice of instruments. Here 
again, it will make a big difference which “box” our regulated party falls into. 
Once more, prior commenters have argued that the transfer of resources from the 
regulated party to other private individuals or the public makes price instruments 
unambiguously superior, on welfare terms, to transferless regulation.254 That is, 
since the welfare effect of a carbon tax is E – C – L + R, while the effect of a 
similar command & control regime is presumably E – C – L, the tax is always 
superior to the extent of any revenue gains.255 
The same could be true of internality regulation. To the extent that 
consumers are aware of the effect of the transferless regulation, we might expect 
the regulation to provide the same labor-supply effects that a tax would. That is, 
if the regulation is experienced as an unwanted psychic cost (the hassle of going 
back for a second tiny cup of soda, say), it will diminish the pleasure of the 
drinking experience, lowering the returns to labor.256 If government policies are 
perceived as helpful because they lead to better allocation of the consumer’s 
spending choices, transferless regulation should match the impact of a tax or 
other “stick,” but lack the corresponding revenue. 
In earlier work, I attempted to show that this syllogism is not true to the 
extent that government has available transferless instruments that have lesser 
                                                 
 254 See sources cited supra note 201. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Glaeser, supra note 201, at 150. 
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effects on consumer welfare and labor supply than the carbon tax.257 For 
example, nudges and other “surprising” instruments may sometimes change 
consumer behavior without consumers necessarily noticing that much important 
has changed.258 If so, then it becomes ambiguous which instrument is better on 
basic utility terms, as E – C – L + R < > E – C. 
To be more concrete, consider the choice between raising tobacco taxes and 
the global efforts to label cigarette packaging with disturbing images of adverse 
health outcomes.259 Let’s posit that some fraction of smokers fall in Box 4 of 
Figure 1; that is, they would prefer to quit but lack the willpower to do so, and 
appreciate government efforts to motivate their cessation efforts. 
It is unclear if the images are inferior on revenue terms. Both options, if 
effective, would encourage greater labor effort by improving the smoker’s 
perceived returns to working (because she smokes less, improving her health), 
while reducing incentives to work because the smoker will perceive herself to be 
richer. The higher tax, in addition, brings in revenue, and as we just saw may 
even on net produce a double dividend. The disturbing images, of course, do not 
bring in money (and may reduce revenue if the government maintains a tobacco 
excise at a lower rate). 
Whether nudges are the better choice than taxes turns on the relative labor 
effects of the nudge and the tax. Do disturbing images make smokers feel less 
inclined to work, because the discomfort they feel when they smoke reduces the 
total reward they can buy with their labor effort? If so, then taxes are superior: 
both choices have similar labor-supply effects, while taxes bring in money. But if 
not, then even if there is a double dividend from cigarette taxes the nudge is 
likely a better choice. Taxes have lower labor and more revenue, while the nudge 
has less revenue but more labor supplied.260 That is, the nudge is superior if 
 (I – C + Lsb – Lst –Li + R < I – C + Lsb – Li ) = (R < Lst) (Eq. 4) 
I showed in my earlier work that under standard assumptions R < Lst: the nudge 
is preferable to the tax.261 
That is also the case, a fortiori, for Box 3 taxpayers. As we saw, there is no 
double-dividend scenario for taxing individuals in Box 3.262 If nudges are better 
even when using them means giving up a double dividend, they must be better 
when it does not.263 
                                                 
 257 Galle, supra note 26, at 867–71. 
 258 Id. at 867–68. 
 259 See sources cited supra note 17. 
 260 Note that since labor is taxed, the extra labor supply under a nudge also has a revenue 
benefit. For simplicity, I simply assume that this benefit is already reflected in the L terms. 
 261 Galle, supra note 26, at 869–71. 
 262 See supra notes 240–241. 
 263 In terms of my simple equations, a nudge is better for Box 3 taxpayers when I – C – L + R 
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Perhaps surprisingly, nudges may lose out for Box 1 individuals, the 
inattentive. In the best-case scenario for taxation I just sketched, inattentive 
actors do not adjust labor supply in response to changes in their consumption. 
Switching to a nudge then sacrifices the double dividend, without gaining any 
off-setting labor supply benefits. In math terms, I + R > I. 
In sum, it looks preliminarily as though “nudges” and other surprising 
instruments are the best choice for consumers who experience willpower or 
bolstering problems, while sin taxes make more sense for the inattentive. Again, 
we do not yet fully understand the labor-supply effects of many internality-
correction options. If the labor supply effects of sin taxes for the inattentive fall 
short of the best-case scenario, that might tip the balance back towards nudging. 
iii. A Note on Non-Labor Distortions 
Recent work in tax economics suggests that the impact of taxes on labor 
supply may be only a small portion of the total impact of most taxes.264 Instead, 
the deadweight loss of taxation is mostly caused by other behavioral shifts 
individuals undertake in order to avoid tax— for instance, individuals may 
choose to go into business for themselves so that their income cannot be reported 
to the government.265 Depending on other factors, the diminished importance of 
labor distortions can strengthen the argument for a pigouvian tax.266 
Applying this framework in the internality context is a complex problem. A 
key question, certainly, would be to what extent transferless policies inspire the 
same kinds of avoidance behaviors that a tax would create. On that front we have 
even less empirical evidence than we do on the labor-supply question. My view 
is thus that it’s too soon to try to build a complete analysis, but this will remain 
an important open area for future work. 
D. Information and Targeting 
Another standard argument in favor of price instruments over regulation is 
that they provide better information about private costs.267 Typically government 
cannot directly observe the private marginal cost of compliance.268 However, a 
                                                                                                                         
< I – C – L, which is to say never. 
 264 David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital 
Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 376–400 (2015). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Cf. John Brooks, Brian Galle, & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden 
Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018) (arguing that Gamage’s framework supports use of 
consumption taxes in some instances). 
 267 Don Fullerton et al., Environmental Taxes, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES 
REVIEW 423, 430 (James Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010). Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 52, at 4. 
 268 Id. 
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price instrument induces rational externality producers to comply if their private 
costs are less than the price set.269 By iterating this process, government can 
gather enough data about private cost structures to better approximate the optimal 
price.270 This information is also potentially critical to effective targeting of a 
policy: government does not want to distort the behavior of those who are 
already performing in their own self-interest.271 
Of course, for our purposes the critical assumption in the standard account is 
that the observed response to price is a rational one. Yet we already know that in 
many cases it is not.272 Eighty-five percent of Danish workers ignored a large 
new tax incentive for retirement savings.273 Does that tell us that the cost of 
retirement savings was very high, or just that Danes prefer not to think about Act 
Five of their lives? It seems that in many cases price instruments are no better 
than others at revealing private information.274 We have seen that Schwartz and 
others rely on this fact as a basis for objecting to any form of internality 
regulation. 
I argued earlier that experiments and self-targeted instruments answer 
Schwartz’s critique, and they also serve to level the playing field between price 
and other instruments. Because the Danish experiment had a control group of 
individuals whose costs of savings were indistinguishable from the treatment 
group—and that control group responded strongly to the tax incentive—we can 
infer that the unresponsiveness of the bulk of the population was due to 
behavioral factors, not cost.275 Well-designed experiments like this allow 
government not only to identify individuals who need a little help, but also to 
                                                 
 269 Id. 
 270 Strnad, supra note 2, at 1254–55. 
 271 Id.; cf. Kaplow, supra note 238, at 22 (discussing significance of policy choice when 
population is heterogeneous in their propensity for error); Tor, supra note 151, at 26–27 (same). 
Allcott & Sunstein rely on a version of the targeting argument to favor energy subsidies over clean-
fuel mandates, but their analysis may be a bit off. They suggest that a subsidy will be superior to a 
“mandate that all consumers take action” because the mandate will cause compliance among some 
consumers for whom compliance is inefficient. Allcott & Sunstein, Working Paper, supra note 14, 
at 7. This confuses the form of an instrument with its price. Allcott & Sunstein appear to assume 
that the mandate would apply to every consumer–in effect, that its price would be infinite. But 
transferless instruments, including many command & control approaches, can have an effective or 
“shadow” price of any amount. Galle, supra note 26, at 862. To take one example, the mandate 
could exempt any consumer with private compliance costs above what would have been the 
subsidy amount. This would effectively set the price of compliance at tau for either instrument. The 
duo acknowledges this point later in their discussion, Allcott & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 9, so 
perhaps we should understand their claim simply to be that a flat ban on inefficient energy use by 
all consumers is bad policy, rather than a general claim about the merits of taxes over mandates. 
 272 See Weiss, supra note 3, at 1312. 
 273 Chetty et al., supra note 84, at 1141. 
 274 See Mullainathan et al., supra note 168, at 17.8–17.9, 17.22. 
 275 Chetty et al., supra note 84, at 1169–72. 
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draw inferences about the private cost structures of the targeted groups.276 In a 
regulatory environment in which government is already conducting experiments 
before it regulates, the need to rely on price instruments to reveal information is 
considerably lessened. 
If anything, price instruments might be less appealing in an internality 
context because they may be more difficult to design as self-targeting. “Linear” 
taxes, or taxes that apply a uniform per-unit rate, are difficult to make 
asymmetrical.277 It’s true, of course, that a teetotaler will not pay much alcohol 
tax.278 But the large man who rationally consumes alcohol at a slow, steady pace 
will pay far more than the slender woman who irrationally binges. That is poor 
targeting. 
Nonetheless, with some creativity policy makers can likely reduce the 
inflexibility of tax-like instruments. Consider a system of opt-in taxation.279 
Individuals could agree to be subject to a higher tax rate on some goods. Ian 
Ayres’s StickK, a company that allows users to pledge to pay a penalty if they 
fail to meet personal goals, has already adopted this method.280 
Similarly, government could allow households to opt out of government 
subsidies for overly tempting products. Some states are currently considering a 
prohibition on junk food for families who receive SNAP benefits,281 but a more 
empowering option that would also reveal better information would be an opt-in 
system in which households have the power to move selected categories of food 
and beverage on or off a “banned” list.282 Perhaps modifying the list could not be 
done in-store, which would help to reduce the likelihood that the family would 
buy the items it does not want to be tempted by. Manuel Utset and I have also 
proposed a kindred idea in the consumer credit context, in which recipients of 
government rebates are defaulted into saving a portion, but have the power to 
access the funds in emergencies and to change the default savings level.283 
                                                 
 276 Galle, supra note 26, at 861–63. 
 277 Fleischer, supra note , at 1686, 1697–1701; Haavio & Kotakorpi, supra note 108, at 576. 
 278 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 40, at 1831 (claiming that tax distortions on rational 
actors are “second order”). 
 279 Pratt, supra note 74, at 131–32. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying 
Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & 
Proceedings) 186, 190 (2003), for an early version of a voluntary sin tax proposal. 
 280 IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCKING THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS 
DONE Ch. 8 (2010). 
 281 Anemona Hartocollis, New York Asks to Bar Use of Food Stamps to Buy Sodas, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, at A1; Steve Mistler, Maine DHHS Renews Push for Ban on Buying 
Soda and Candy with Food Stamps, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 23, 2015. 
 282 Cf. Janet Schwartz et al., Healthier by Precommitment, 25 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 538, 538–
46 (2013) (reporting experiment in which consumers could trigger loss of an existing subsidy if 
they failed to improve their healthy shopping). 
 283 Galle & Utset, supra note 89, at 84–87. 
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What about the inattentive? Two Finnish economists, Haavio and Kotakorpi, 
argue that taxes cannot be made to vary with an individual’s propensity to make 
mistakes, both because that is unobservable (they say) and because mistake-free 
buyers would purchase tax-free and then resell at a discount to the error-prone. 284 
Transaction costs would often remove the second concern. Even assuming that 
both concerns were in full force, regulators could design around them by taxing 
observable behaviors that are correlated with internalities, not the internality 
itself.285 
An example here could be a tax that scales up with portion size. The bigger 
the bottle of soda, or the more cigarettes per package, the greater the tax rate per 
ounce or per cigarette. Analyses of inattentive behaviors show that portion size is 
a major driver of consumption—or, to put it another way, the minor nuisance of 
having to acquire another serving slows consumption considerably among those 
who tend to be overconsumers.286 Of course, retailers would respond to the 
scaled-up tax rate by selling smaller portions, but that is exactly the goal of the 
policy; by reducing portion size, we also reduce internalities. For rational actors, 
the bother of buying a second cup is trivial. We therefore have an instrument that, 
despite being a tax, is nonetheless asymmetric: rational actors will not pay it. 
E. Distribution 
Distributive considerations can also be important to choosing an instrument, 
and typically will favor transferless instruments.287 Some are relatively 
straightforward. Critics of sin taxes often complain that they fall more heavily on 
the poor.288 Gruber and Koszegi respond that, by assumption, an internality-
correcting tax on net improves well-being for each individual, so that if the tax 
falls more on the poor this simply means that it provides even greater benefits for 
                                                 
 284 Haavio & Kotakorpi, supra note 108, at 587. 
 285 Cf. Mullainathan et al., supra note 168, at 17.18 & n.17 (suggesting that effective prices 
can be varied with degree of internality by concentrating enforcement based on observable 
correlates of internality). 
 286 See Chandon, supra note 83, at 16 (connecting portion size and inattention to overeating); 
Andrew B. Geier et al., Unit Bias: A New Heuristic That Helps Explain the Effect of Portion Size 
on Food Intake, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 521, 5224 (2006) (suggesting that “immediate presence” of 
tempting goods drive the effects of portion size on consumption). 
 287 While it is possible, and perhaps even preferable, for policy makers to analyze each rule 
as though it were enacted simultaneously with a perfectly offsetting adjustment to the income tax, 
Kaplow, supra note 128, at 488, 494, in practice this step may not always be feasible, id. at 499. 
Among other reasons, it may be difficult to observe the distributive effects of some policies, such 
as the self-targeting instruments I have described here. In that situation, Kaplow suggests analyzing 
the policy as though it were transferless, but immediately followed by an income tax adjustment 
with the appropriate redistributive characteristics. Id. at 498. 
 288 Lucas, supra note 237, at 738–39; Pratt, supra note 74, at 121–24. 
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the poor than its burdens.289 But this latter analysis overlooks opportunity costs. 
Assuming that the government has available some other, transferless, instrument 
that potentially provides individuals with the same benefits as the tax, the tax will 
necessarily be more regressive than the tax-free alternative, unless it is offset by 
refunds or other support. 290 
Free or subsidized support for internality-sufferers can also be an efficient 
way of redistributing to the poor. In general, the distributive features of 
externality correction policies do not offer reasons to enact them, as the same 
redistributive benefits could be obtained through a simpler, less-distortive income 
tax.291 Recall, however, that in-kind transfers can be more efficient than cash 
transfers via the tax system in the special case where the in-kind benefit 
disproportionately benefits individuals with low earning potential.292 Then the 
government can support indigent households without creating incentives for 
individuals with high earning potential to stay home. Internality correction, we 
saw earlier, can have this feature. Since internality-correcting taxes or other 
“sticks” would undercut the benefit of efficient redistribution by diminishing the 
size of the net benefit the poor receive, these options are less appealing than 
others in some cases. 
F. Summary 
Let’s try to pull together some of these threads. First, in many cases carrots 
are likely to remain the least favored policy. Carrots for internalities lack the 
ruinous moral hazard problems they pose for externalities, but they remain 
socially costly because they must be paid for through some kind of tax revenue. 
As a form of price instrument, carrots for externalities can generate better 
information than transferless policies, but we have seen that these information 
benefits will often be minor or redundant in the internality context. Thus, the 
extra cost of carrots is only likely to be worth paying if their income or 
redistributive benefits are large enough to justify the markup. Both of these 
factors can arise sometimes but are not at all universal. 
Next, nudges and other “surprising” transferless instruments, such as 
                                                 
 289 Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Tax Incidence When Individuals are Time-
Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1960 (2004); see also 
Avigail Kifer, The Incidence of a Soda Tax, in Pennies and Pounds, unpublished manuscript. Nov. 
25, 2014, at 5 (making same claim about soda taxes). 
 290 See Emmanuel Farhi & Xavier Gabaix, Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents, NBER 
Working Paper No. 21524, Aug. 26, 2015, at 26; cf. Haavio & Kotakorpi, supra note 108, at 576 
(noting that sin taxes transfer wealth from the irrational to the rational). On the refund possibility, 
see Hines, supra note 127, at 65. 
 291 KAPLOW, supra note 189, at 32. 
 292 See supra text accompanying notes 187–190. 
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defaults and choice architecture, look like potentially strong options for 
overcoming willpower or confirmation-bias failures, especially when willpower 
failures are correlated with low earning capacity. Again, there will often be little 
information lost by abandoning transfer instruments for nudges. The nudge is less 
regressive than a tax would be and may even serve as an efficient mode of 
supporting the poor. Depending on the labor-supply effects of a given nudge, it 
may be superior on revenue terms to a tax alternative. And even the income 
effects of the nudge are preferable in the case of tempting inferior goods. 
The case is less clear cut for the inattentive. For these individuals, a tax 
potentially could be a very efficient revenue-raiser, although there would be 
serious distributive fairness concerns if it ended up falling mostly on lower-
income households. The income effects of the tax are also more likely to be 
useful in most cases, since most consumption goods are ordinary. 
It’s worth emphasizing, too, that government need not rely on a single 
instrument for any given social problem. As the externality literature recognizes, 
there are some good arguments for relying on multiple instruments, including my 
recent argument that it allows for a way of imposing multiple ex ante price 
points.293 In addition, we have seen that different cognitive failings may produce 
the same mistaken behavior. If some over-eaters are inattentive while others 
suffer willpower failures, it could make sense to use a different instrument to 
help each of the sub-populations.294 In some cases, though, instruments may be in 
tension with one another. A nudge aimed at Box 4 consumers might reduce 
demand among Box 1 individuals, diminishing tax revenues earned from taxing 
the inattentive.295 If these revenues were the main reason for adopting the tax, 
that combination might not make sense. 
Another argument for multiple instruments arises if actors vary in their 
sensitivity to dollar instruments. In that case, I have shown, the optimal approach 
is to increase the price of the instrument, but not by so much as to fully correct 
the behavior of the most insensitive. 296 The intuition for this result is similar to 
the argument for using several ex ante prices: because the social cost of errors 
                                                 
 293 Galle, supra note 122, at 1730–33; David M. Driesen, Emissions Trading Versus 
Pollution Taxes: Playing “Nice” with Other Instruments, 48 ENVTL. L. REV. __ , manuscript at 32 
(forthcoming 2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 715, 719 (2011); see Emanuel Saez, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Tax Expenditures, 88 J. 
PUB. ECON. 2657, 2659–60 (2004) (explaining use of tax subsidies and adjustments to level of 
direct government provision as complementary tools); see generally Vidar Christiansen & Stephen 
Smith, Externality-Correcting Taxes and Regulation, 114 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 358 (2012). 
 294 Allcott et al., supra note 138, at 77–78. Similarly, if there are both consumption 
externalities and internalities, different instruments may be necessary to target both effectively. 
Madrian, supra note 157, at § 2; Goldin & Lawson, supra note 14, at 441. 
 295 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 238, at 22 (noting that mandatory savings and savings subsidies 
produce inefficient results when combined). 
 296 Galle, supra note 177, at 77–81. 
49
Galle: The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 18:1 (2018) 
50 
grows exponentially, it is better to make a few small mistakes than one big 
one.297 Even better, though, would be to eliminate one of the small mistakes. A 
second, behavioral instrument aimed at the group that is most insensitive to a 
traditional tax or subsidy would improve over the dollar instrument alone.298 
Enforcement costs might offer a third reason for multiple instruments. 
Suppose, for example, that our instrument is a carrot, which must be paid for 
with tax revenues. The benefits of offering the carrot are counter-balanced by the 
economic distortions caused by raising taxes to pay for the carrot. A standard 
result in the externality literature is that, in situations where government faces 
tradeoffs of this kind, it may not be optimal to set subsidy levels at the full 
internality-correcting level (tau, or “𝜏” in Figure One).299 At prices very close to 
tau, there is little marginal benefit from further policy change: government has 
already helped those who are the worst off, and the gains from helping the next 
worst-off grow steadily smaller. At the same time, the costs of implementing that 
policy are growing—in our example, the tax burden of paying for more and more 
carrots. Balancing these two factors against each other, it often will not be cost 
effective to help everyone. 
Multiple instruments can help to solve the costly tradeoff problem. As with 
any standard tax, the economic distortion of each instrument should grow 
exponentially with its effective rate.300 This implies that, by using two small 
“taxes” or instruments instead of one big one, the government will often face less 
of a tradeoff when it implements its policy.301 It can, cost-effectively, get closer 
to the full internality-correcting price. 
Obviously, there remains an enormous amount of uncertainty with all of 
these prescriptions. My goal is not to be able to provide definitive answers to, 
say, how to regulate vaccinations. The point instead is to identify for further 
study the factors that we need to know in order to make the best policy.   
VI. APPLICATION: TOBACCO REGULATION 
To repeat, at this point there remain important unknowns in evaluating the 
best policy for any given internality. To make my analysis concrete, though, I 
offer some preliminary thoughts, given the available evidence, on how my 
                                                 
 297 Id. at 78–79. 
 298 See Farhi & Gabaix, supra note 290, at 25, 28 (modeling combination of tax and nudge 
when some actors are insensitive to taxes). 
 299 Bovenberg & Goulder, supra note 228, at 1486. 
 300 See id. (explaining equivalence of taxes and other costly regulations). 
 301 This argument assumes the distortive behavior produced by the two instruments does not 
overlap. For a more general discussion of this assumption and its importance, see David Gamage, 
How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice? A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal 
Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 21–44 (2014). 
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argument would apply to a significant real-world source of internalities: 
smoking. 
Recent U.S. efforts to follow other countries around the world in requiring 
that packages of cigarettes prominently display graphic images of smoking’s 
health consequences were stymied by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit.302 The panel ruled that the images infringed on the First-
Amendment right of manufacturers to control their brand message, the 
administration declined to seek certiorari, and the government went back to the 
drawing board.303 But two years later, the full D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc in a 
different dispute, ruled that the relatively searching scrutiny it had used in the 
earlier case was not justified in the commercial speech context.304 Therefore it 
appears there is again an opportunity to revive the graphic-images rule.305 What 
can the government say in defense of graphic images? 
Smoking is a cognitively complex behavior, with different smokers seeming 
to exhibit different kinds of at least arguably irrational behavior. Evidence 
suggests some smokers are classic examples of Box 4 willpower failure–no 
surprise, since nicotine is addictive.306 Another contributing cause for some 
smokers is a form of inattention bias, in which the immediate visceral temptation 
of habitual cues that trigger the urge to smoke bypass rational thought 
processes.307 These we might place in Box 1. A small group of smokers seem to 
reject evidence that their personal risks of smoking are serious, even though these 
individuals tend to be among the heaviest smokers.308 That, of course, accords 
well with our Box 3. 
To meet the challenge of this very heterogeneous group of consumers, 
tobacco control policy likely must be equally complex. For each sub-population 
of smokers, a different regulatory instrument may be optimal. Further, it may be 
optimal to use multiple instruments even within each sub-group. A number of 
studies show that graphic images have helped to motivate and encourage quitting 
                                                 
 302 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 303 Letter from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip 
/legacy/2014/07/23/03-15-2013.pdf. 
 304 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 305 For more detailed discussion of the First-Amendment issues, see Rebecca Tushnet, More 
Than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2404–15, 2442–43 
(2014). 
 306 Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 77, at 1278; Joni Hersch, Smoking Restrictions as a Self-
Control Mechanism, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6 (2005). 
 307 Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 55, at 44–45; George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of 
Addiction, in GETTING HOOKED: RATIONALITY AND ADDICTION 235, 237–45 (Jon Elster & Ole-
Jórgen Skog eds., 1999). 
 308 AUSTRALIA GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH AND AGING, supra note 17, at 57. 
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and its follow-through, and to discourage adolescent smoking.309 Which 
instrument or instruments, then, should we choose? 
Let’s take Box 4 willpower-failure sufferers to start. For them, my earlier 
analysis implies that the graphic images policy is the best choice, given one key 
factual assumption. If it is the case that the images do not have significant 
impacts on labor/leisure decisions or related distortions typically associated with 
a sales tax, then the images are on net preferable strictly on revenue terms. That 
is, although they bring in less money than a tax would, they also produce less 
deadweight loss, so that on net the government comes out ahead with the images. 
It’s worth emphasizing we do not currently have evidence on that question. It 
seems likely, though, that those who have a long-term preference for quitting 
would view the images as on net improving, not diminishing, the value of their 
take-home pay. The images also have helpful distributive effects. Since smokers 
tend to be poorer, and the policy on net helps smokers, it is actually progressive 
overall. It is particularly progressive compared to a tax alternative.310 
There is, though, a fair argument in favor of subsidies or other “carrots” for 
smoking cessation, and likely the optimal policy is a mix of carrots and graphic 
images. The correlation between low willpower, smoking, and low earning 
potential makes smoking-cessation subsidies a highly efficient tool for 
redistribution. But carrots also have downsides, including the tax cost of paying 
for them, which is in turn compounded by the carrots’ potential income effects. 
Both of these problems likely grow exponentially with the size of the subsidy.311 
Further, the redistributive rationale would be turned on its head to the extent that 
subsidies are claimed by smokers of higher income. 
As I mentioned earlier, tradeoffs of this kind offer a strong case for multiple 
instruments.312 In this instance, it would probably not be optimal to pay the price 
of a carrot for every last smoker, so the optimal carrot is less than the full 
internality-correcting price. Graphic images could be used to make up the 
                                                 
 309 For surveys, see id.; Hammond, supra note 17, at 329–34. The D.C. Circuit, in finding 
that the U.S. FDA had failed to show evidence that vivid images would reduce smoking, cherry-
picked a single sentence from Hammond’s review in which he expressed reservations about the 
empirical methodology of one paper. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 
1205, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Overall, he reports, “[T]he research literature unequivocally 
demonstrates the impact of comprehensive health warnings.” Hammond, supra note 17, at 334. 
 310 Lucas argues that “psychic” taxes are regressive, Gary Lucas, Paternalism and Psychic 
Taxes: The Government’s Use of Negative Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 227, 297–98 (2013), but fails to distinguish between psychic and real taxes. 
A tax that is collected in dollars, because of the diminishing marginal utility of money, has much 
greater impact on poor households. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1121 
(1972). 
 311 See supra text accompanying notes 218–219. 
 312 See supra text accompanying notes 299–301. 
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resulting gap between tau and the subsidy price. 
Let’s move on now to Box 1. The optimal policy for the cue-triggered 
smokers in Box 1 is probably a mirror image of the ideal Box 4 strategy: instead 
of carrots and images, the best choice is taxes and images. Our analysis earlier 
suggests that taxes on inattentive smokers are probably a highly efficient revenue 
source, though that would be less true to the extent that they trigger labor-supply 
or related distortions. The revenue benefit, and its accompanying helpful income 
effects, have to be traded off against the sharply regressive impact of a 
substantial tobacco tax.313 If the resulting optimal tax were less than tau,314 the 
graphic images could be added to the policy mix in order to obtain full deterrence 
of the internality. Images are also helpful to the extent that some inattentive 
smokers are inattentive to the cigarette tax, but are still sensitive to graphic 
images (for example, because the images disrupt the tempting cues that otherwise 
trigger smoking).315 
Combining our strategies for Box 1 and Box 4 is tricky. While it is not 
necessarily absurd to try to enact both a tax and a subsidy at the same time, it 
may be more sensible simply to rely on graphic images and other “transferless” 
policies instead. If the tax and subsidy exactly offset—say, if all the new 
cigarette tax revenues are used to support smoking cessation—then on net what 
we have done is enact a mandate to purchase smoking cessation. 316 Smokers 
would also retain a marginal incentive to cut back, since they could still reduce 
their personal contribution to the cessation program with each puff they snuff.317 
A mandate to buy cessation could be defensible, as perhaps for some smokers the 
cost of cigarettes is crowding out cessation spending.318 But it would require 
large administrative costs to administer both the tax and the subsidy.319 We might 
                                                 
 313 See Farhi & Gabaix, supra note 290, at 26 (modeling efficiency tradeoff between 
distortions and redistribution for low-salience taxes). While one could imagine strategies for 
avoiding the regressive impact of the tax—for example, implementing the “tax” as a smoking 
license fee, and granting free licenses to poorer households—these approaches would mostly 
eliminate the efficiency advantage of the tax by turning it into a de facto tax on income. 
 314 Note that, because of the revenue benefits, the optimal Box 1 tax could conceivably 
exceed tau if there were no redistributive concerns. 
 315 See Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 55, at 44–45 (suggesting that cue-triggered smokers 
should be unresponsive to future tax cost of smoking). 
 316 See KAPLOW, supra note 189, at 13–34 (analyzing externality-correcting policy enacted 
together with exacting offsetting tax adjustment). 
 317 Id. 
 318 Cf. Susan H. Busch et al., Burning a Hole in the Budget: Tobacco Spending and its 
Crowd-Out of Other Goods, 3 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 263, 266–71 (2004) 
(reporting that smoking expenditures displace rent and food). 
 319 For an overview of enforcement issues in tobacco excise collection, see Department of the 
Treasury Report to Congress on Federal Tobacco Receipts Lost Due to Illicit Trade and 
Recommendations for Increased Enforcement, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.ttb.gov/pdf/tobacco-
receipts.pdf. 
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justify the costs by arguing that cessation and taxing policies reached different 
individuals than the images alone could. If not, though, it seems better to simply 
rely on the images, which provide marginal incentives to quit with something 
like one-third the administrative apparatus. 
On the other hand, if the policies do not perfectly offset, we are left with a 
stub version of either one, potentially with helpful economic results. For instance, 
if the rich pay cigarette taxes but do not take up free government cessation 
programs (perhaps because they can afford better programs on their own), then 
we have achieved a small, but quite efficient, redistributive tax. 
The presence of Box 3 smokers might push us towards the three-instrument 
option. Although evidence is still very preliminary, some research does suggest 
that graphic images can prompt stronger bolstering and denial responses among 
the group of heavy smokers, diminishing the efficacy of the image.320 It might be 
worth paying the extra administrative costs of the tax/subsidy/graphic image 
combination to reach these individuals, although admittedly they are a relatively 
small share of smokers. 
If there is such a thing as a “rational smoker,”321 their presence also would 
suggest that multiple instruments could be optimal. Externalities or other market 
failures aside, the government should not try to change the behavior of rational 
actors.322 Where the government faces a mix of rational and irrational 
individuals, we have seen, the tau or price it presents should usually be a 
weighted average of the zero price that should face the fully rational and 
whatever other prices should face various internality sufferers—essentially, 
balancing the harm to the rational against the help for the irrational. If 
government has some evidence that allows it to make educated guesses about 
who is in which pool, it can use multiple instruments to strike a better balance for 
each group.323 
Extensive heterogeneity in smokers’ need for government help, then, would 
offer another rationale for using multiple instruments to combat smoking. Gary 
Lucas argues that government should limit itself to offering opt-in commitment 
devices, such as voluntary smoking licenses, in order to avoid burdening possible 
rational smokers.324 The trouble with this suggestion is that it leaves those who 
do not seek out commitment devices, our Box 3 and naïve Box 1 smokers, 
without any help at all. Better would be to implement a general policy for all 
smokers, with a relatively lower tau, that accounts for the possibility that some in 
                                                 
 320 AUSTRALIA GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH AND AGING, supra note 17, at 41. 
 321 Becker & Murphy, supra note 108, at 694–95. 
 322 GRUBER, supra note 24, at 3. 
 323 Galle, supra note 122, at 1730–34. 
 324 Lucas, supra note 237, at 743–44. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1399, 1483–85 (2005), for a more detailed proposal. 
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that group may have no or smaller internalities. On top of that, individuals could 
opt into more costly policies, reflecting the fact that those who have opted in 
have, on average, more need for help. In other words, the voluntary license could, 
and likely should, exist side-by-side with graphic images. 
In short, there are good reasons for the U.S. Food & Drug Administration to 
go forward with its stalled regulatory project on graphic images for tobacco 
control. And, if confronted by a skeptical court wondering why taxes and 
subsidies are not preferable alternatives to infringing on the commercial speech 
of cigarette makers, the FDA now has some good answers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The analogy between externality regulation and internalities is powerful. The 
lessons of the externality literature not only help us to see why we should 
regulate internalities—answering, for example, the heterogeneity and information 
constraint objections to paternalistic regulation—but also how. But, as I have 
tried to explore here, internalities are also different. They present unique 
informational challenges we are still learning to overcome. And some standard 
verities of externality control, such as the clear advantages of price instruments, 
and the clear inefficiency of carrots, are not at all obvious when translated to 
internalities. 
I do not mean to claim that the answers I offer here are the best or the final 
word. In general, my goal instead has been to sketch policy possibilities and 
reveal places where answers depend on unknown facts. My hope is that this work 
helps establish an empirical research agenda for myself and others, and to 
stimulate discussion about what we think we do know. 
At a minimum, though, I hope that I have shown it is more than possible to 
make an efficiency case for nudges and other kinds of cognitively-informed 
regulation, particularly in the internality context. While refinements and counter-
arguments certainly are likely to come, the economic case for nudging is too 
good to dismiss with a wave and the cry, “paternalism!” 
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